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The adoption of government-issued health technology services is a timely topic because of 
the pandemic we face. Analyzing the decision-making of individuals in the context of 
technologies is of scientific interest because biases can be identified and interpreted. This 
research analyzes how the privacy paradox is at play in the context of government-issued health 
technology services. Quantitative research was conducted on Belgian citizens who own a 
smartphone to analyze the privacy paradox in the context of CovidsafeBE and Coronalert. The 
results of this research were used to analyze the different hypotheses formulated in our 
conceptual model. The findings are that the privacy paradox cannot fully be considered for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Context 
The twenty-first century has seen an impressive growth in the use of technologies. One of 
these technologies is social media, which is used by more than half of the world’s population 
(Kemp, 2020). Technologies such as social media have allowed companies to apply data-centric 
product strategies (Saura et al., 2021). This strategy is possible because users generate a lot of 
data. Two ways are identifiable; users integrate personal data such as date of birth or home 
address; and users generate data with their activity on technologies such as social media. These 
types of data are part of “big data”, i.e., large volume of data (Saura et al., 2021). It is composed 
of structured, semi-structured and/or unstructured types of data and the data generated by users 
is part of the unstructured data (Ghani et al., 2019). 
 
Big data can be considered as a tool to keep track of the behavior of individuals to gain 
profit, or as S. Zuboff would say: “big data is above all the foundational component in a deeply 
intentional and highly consequential new logic of accumulation that I call surveillance 
capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015, p. 75). Surveillance capitalism occurs when data collected about 
users is used by companies for economic purposes, with little regard for the privacy of users 
(Saura et al., 2021). The main economic goal is targeted advertising, which is made possible by 
predicting users' behavior through the data collected about them.    
 
User generated data worries users, because of what can be done with this data (Saura et al., 
2021). The different risks linked with the use of data are: (1) data breaches, occurring when 
data is stolen from individuals or organizations; (2) the use of non-consented data, happening 
happens when organizations use users’ data without them knowing; (3) the misuse of data by 
firms, happening when companies utilize users’ data for non-initial purposes; and (4) the misuse 
of data by authorities, taking place when authorities use data to control or influence their 
citizens (She et al., 2020; Saura et al., 2020; Aridor et al., 2020; Curran & Smart, 2021; 
Meridith,2018). 
 
 A survey conducted by Deloitte shows that 58% of respondents want to reduce the amount 
of personal data available online but do not know how to do so (Data Privacy Awareness, 2020). 




Eurobarometer of 2020 - 2021, 54% of respondents in the European Union do not trust the 
Internet and 68% of them do not trust social networks (Standard Eurobarometer, 2020, 
p.28,29). Similarly, many citizens are concerned about the misuse of their personal data. 41% 
of European citizens do not want to share their personal data with private companies. 
Additionally, 30% of the citizens are worried about advertisers, businesses, and foreign 
governments accessing their personal data (FRA, 2020). However, 75% of Europeans use the 
Internet daily or almost daily and 52% use social networks daily or almost daily (Standard 
Eurobarometer, 2020, p.130,132). Furthermore, more than half of the world’s population uses 
social media as of July 2020. Only central Asia, South Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and 
West Africa are below the bar of 50% of their population using social media (Kemp, 2020). 
The four most used social media applications are Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp and 
Facebook messenger (Kemp, 2020). Yet Facebook, which owns WhatsApp and Messenger; and 
Google, which owns YouTube, are companies known to collect massive amounts of personal 
data on their users (Stucke, 2018).  This points to a certain privacy paradox because even if 
users do not trust the Internet and social networks, it is evident they still use them. The privacy 
paradox is a phenomenon that describes the inconsistency between a user’s attitude and their 
actual behavior. In other words, they will not protect their personal information online even 
though they are concerned about their privacy (Barth et de Jong, 2017).  
 
Nonetheless, there are also positive aspects to data collection. It is beneficial in various fields 
such as healthcare or the public sector (Ghani et al., 2019). Healthcare is improved as big data 
is used to emit more accurate disease diagnostics or provide more personalized medicine; the 
public sector also benefits as needs are more easily identified and met, and new products and 
services can easily be issued through data analysis (Manyika et al., 2011). The spur in 
technology of the twenty-first century has enabled the public sector to implement e-
government, which allows government services to modernize using available technologies. The 
interaction of e-government is done in different ways: from government to citizens, from 
government to employees, from government to business, from government to other 
governments and from citizens to governments. The rate of interaction between the different 
parties is increased, the information between them is also more transparent, and operating costs 
decrease (Het Begrip E-Government, 2021). Examples of applications of e-government in 
Belgium are eHealth, Coronalert, and Myminfin. The first is a website that citizens can access 




created for contact tracing in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic (Coronalert, n.d.); and the 
third is a website that citizens can use to view their tax calculations, real estate cadastral income 
or rental agreements, requesting an installment plan, or to pay off debts (MyMinfin, n.d.). 
 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, several social distancing measures were installed worldwide to 
slow the spread of the disease. This virus emerged in late 2019 and in extreme cases can cause 
respiratory failure or septic shock among other things (WHO, 2020). Available technologies 
were very helpful during the Covid-19 pandemic, especially when social barriers had to be 
respected. Telecommuting was made possible so that people would not have to travel to their 
workplace, and families and friends were able to stay connected through various platforms such 
as social media. As a result, the use of social media increased during the pandemic (Drouin et 
al., 2020). In addition, governments around the world launched apps to raise awareness or to 
try to slow the spread of the pandemic (Utz et al., 2021). One example is contact tracing apps 
that alert people if they have been in contact with someone who has tested positive for Covid-
19 (Fahey & Hino, 2020). 
 
The contact tracing application raised many concerns among citizens about data privacy. They 
feared that the government could have direct access to their location, and some were worried 
that the government would use this information against them if they were not respecting social 
distancing (Rowe, 2020). A sort of privacy paradox can be identified in this case because 
citizens must make a decision between prioritizing data privacy or working together to fight the 
pandemic and thus give up some data privacy (Utz et al., 2021).  
2 Research motivation 
It is relevant to analyze the importance of users' data privacy in the current context. Indeed, 
even if they value their privacy, they are not able to protect it properly because of the way 
technology companies have designed their revenue stream to provide different services to users. 
These companies use the decision-making biases of individuals against them (Waldman, 2020). 
For example, they often make sure that users do not have all the information they need to make 






Some services that also collect data but are in the user's interest should bypass this data-driven 
strategy that is applied by profit-driven companies. This should be the case, for example, for 
government-delivered technology services (Fox, 2020). 
 
Analyzing what influences users to not take rational decisions regarding government-
issued health technology services is the motivation for this research. The importance lies in 
the context of the pandemic where health care is central, and the adoption of services could 
help citizens receive better care and the medical profession work more efficiently by focusing 
on patient treatment. 
 
In doing so, we aspire to identify the different biases of the privacy paradox at play in 
the adoption of health technology services issued by the government to avoid possible 
misunderstandings. There are several possible reasons why this could happen, such as not 
having enough transparency regarding the use of data across the service’s different platforms 
or not trusting the government. It is in the interest of the users that their decision to adopt the 
app is justified, but also in the interest of the government to incorporate what is important to 
the user so services can work at their full potential.  
3 Academic motivation 
The decision making of individuals has been studied for a long time. It analyzes how a person 
comes to a decision especially when that decision is not rational, that is to say, not only 
considering advantages and disadvantages (Simon, 1955). Several factors bias the decision such 
as loss aversion of a person or the influence of short-term benefits (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Laibson, 1997). The analysis of this phenomenon and its relationship with new forms of 
technology has been widely studied in recent years. More specifically, the privacy paradox, that 
occurs when users are inconsistent between their intended attitude and their behavior (Barth et 
de Jong, 2017). 
 
Research into how users make decisions has already been conducted, but there is still much 
to discover as the technology grows exponentially. Now that governments are using it to 
communicate with their citizens, it is crucial to analyze how they can be influenced and why. 
One of the most important sectors, healthcare, has also chosen to take the path of phone apps 




of government-provided health technologies has already been analyzed and the findings were 
that several elements influenced the acceptance and continued use of these technologies (Fox, 
2020). However, it would be interesting if the same theories that are at play in the privacy 
paradox regarding social media are also applied in the case of health technology services. 
 
The research conducted in this thesis is to analyze how users of government-provided health 
technologies are influenced by the biases identified in the case of social media use. The intent 
is to provide a better understanding of the choices a user makes regarding health technology 
services and whether those choices are influenced in the same way as social media services. 
The following question will therefore be analyzed during this thesis.  
 
How do the different theories that define the privacy paradox apply to the adoption of 
health technology services issued by the government? 
 
The research will be applied to the case study of two applications that were launched by the 
Belgian government during the Covid-19 pandemic, namely Coronalert and CovidsafeBE. The 
former is a contact tracing app, and the latter is an app that allows the user to have their Covid 
certificate (which can be obtained by being vaccinated, having recovered from Covid-19 or 
having a negative test for Covid-19) on their phone (Coronalert, n.d.; CovidSafeBE, n.d.). 
Analysis of how the privacy paradox applies to the adoption of these services will provide 
interesting new information because they are very recent, dating to 2020 and 2021, respectively. 
Moreover, analysis in light of a pandemic may provide a new way of looking at the privacy 
paradox in this context.   
4 Approach 
The purpose of this research is to analyze how the privacy paradox applies to the adoption 
of health technology services. The thesis is divided into two parts.  
 
The first part is theoretical and consists of 3 chapters. The first chapter describes the use of 
data to be able to understand users’ privacy concerns. Following this, the privacy paradox is 
introduced with the different theoretical concepts related to it. The last chapter is focused on 





The second part of this thesis is an empirical study and consists in three chapters. The first 
chapter focuses on the introduction of the case studies and the methodology that is used to test 
the conceptual model. After that, the reliability and validity of the different constructs are tested 
before analyzing the results of the tests on the different hypotheses. Finally, the last part 











Chapter 2: Literature review 
1 Online data 
This first chapter aims to present the data environment that consumers are confronted with, 
what is done with their data and what are the risks related to each step of the data processing. 
It will provide a better understanding of where users' privacy concerns lie and why they exist.   
1.1 Data collection 
1.1.1 Definition 
Data is collected by five main sources, (1) computer-mediated economic transactions; (2) 
data from sensors that can be found on objects, bodies, and places; (3) data from corporate and 
government databases; (4) data from private and public surveillance cameras; and (5) data that 
is collected on individuals and that is considered as “small” (Zuboff, 2015). 
The “small” data is the data that is “left” by users online, which is also called user-generated 
data. It represents all the data users willingly and knowingly give such as birthdate, email, 
photos or likes, but it also contains data that users are not aware of such as the number of devices 
connected to their IP address or their type of personality (Saura et al., 2021). This data is 
collected by data-driven companies which allows them to predict the users’ behavior and 
optimize the personalization of the service and/or product. In this way, the targeting of 
advertisement can be more precise.   
1.1.2 Risks, data breaches 
One of the risks that comes along with any type of data collection are data breaches. A data 
breach is “an occasion when private information can be seen by people who should not be able 
to see it” (« DATA BREACH | meaning in the Cambridge English dictionary », n. d.). This 
means that if a data breach occurs there is a lack of privacy, and this may lead to drastic 
consequences such as a stolen identity (She et al.,2020). Data breaches happen daily, in 2019 
there were 25 247 data breaches reported in the Netherlands alone, in Belgium this number was 
912 (Johnson J., 2021). The risk of data breaches increases when data driven companies such 
as Facebook or Google sell the collected data to third-party firms (Lulandala, 2020).  
According to Verizon (2020), the two sectors identified as having the most data breaches are 
the healthcare sector with 512 data breaches, or 12,96% of the total amount of data breaches in 




according to previous research, the number of breaches has increased in the healthcare sector 
from 2010 to 2019, particularly due to hacking (Seh et al., 2020). This result is not surprising 
because these two sectors have the most sensitive information, healthcare displays the most 
personal information about individuals and financial information can lead to theft. Thus, the 
data monetization would be much higher in the healthcare sector or the financial sector due to 
the sensitivity of the data. For instance, the 2019 report of IBM security showed that every 
record that is breached costs $429 in 2019 in the healthcare sector and $210 in the financial 
sector, while the average cost per record across all industries was $150 in that year (Cost of a 
Data Breach Report, 2019). 
Data breaches can occur in several ways. In the healthcare and financial sector, the main 
origins of the 512 and 448 data breaches are respectively: hacking, 145 and 193; malware, 33 
and 32; social, 105 and 90; misuse, 73 and 35; error, 181 and 127; physical, 29 and (Verizon, 
2020). Hacking is the action of using stolen login information, abusing weaknesses and 
attacking using backdoors and command & control functions; malware is the action of 
intentionally damaging or endangering a computer or stealing access to it; social actions refer, 
for example, to phishing, where someone is tricked into giving out information by mail or on 
the Internet so that the perpetrator can do things such as steal money from a bank account 
(« PHISHING| Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary, » n.d.); misuse is the action of 
using data in the wrong way; error action is, for example, the delivery of information to the 
wrong person; and physical action is a person stealing data in the form of paper or software 
(Verizon, 2020). The use of backdoors for hacking is the exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
computer systems in order to gain access to them without the need for the identification methods 
that are present in that system (« Backdoor definition », 2021).    
The consequences of data breaches take many forms. For the user, there are privacy and 
security issues. For example, if enough information about the user is available, their identity 
can be stolen, and they can be robbed of their money. For businesses, this can lead to costs as 
mentioned above and a loss of trust from their customers (She et al.,2020). Previous research 
explains that data breaches have a negative impact on trust, one of the reasons being that users 
were reluctant to use Facebook ads shortly after a data breach was made public (Lulandala, 
2020). Other assumptions that were made in this research were: “perceived data breach has a 
negative impact on ad acceptance, data breach has positive impact on privacy concerns, data 
breach has a positive impact on emotional violation, data breach has a positive impact on ad 




p.59). Although these assumptions have not been confirmed by extensive research, they have 
been more or less confirmed by other sources such as the Penomen Institute, whose survey 
found that 65% of respondents had lost trust in the organization where a data breach had 
occurred (The Impact of Data Breaches on Reputation and Share Value, 2017) and by statistics 
from a survey conducted in the UK that showed that 45.4% of the 1269 respondents changed 
their willingness to share personal data online when they became victims of a data breach, 
21.4% experienced no change (Johnson, 2021).  
1.2 Data extraction 
1.2.1 Definition 
Data extraction can happen in two manners, with the user’s consent (for example, the info 
users give to Facebook, such as a birthday date or a current address) or without the user’s 
consent (for example, the info of the user’s friends) (Zuboff, 2015). In the second case, the user 
may not even know that the company can have access to a certain type of information such as 
hobbies, personal appearance, or even daily whereabouts. To be able to collect this unconsented 
data a lot of data collecting companies apply a strategy of “Incursion into legally and socially 
undefended territory until resistance is encountered” (Zuboff, 2015, p.79), so companies have 
access to certain types of information without users being aware of it and by the time they do, 
a lot of non-consensual data has already been collected.  
Users’ consent can be obtained by data-driven companies by offering a service, with the 
information exchanged by consumers being considered as payment for the services offered by 
the company (Wagner et al., 2021). 
1.2.2 Risk, negative perception of ‘trade’ 
Above all, consumers need to be aware that the services they use online are not free and that 
they pay with their data. A 2020 study by Deloitte shows that 60% of consumers use WhatsApp, 
but only 40% of consumers who own a phone say their phone number is on the net (Lee & 
Calugar-Pop, 2020). This shows that a majority of consumers do not understand the extent to 
which their data is collected. Once consumers are aware of the trade they are effectuating with 
online services, consumers might be preoccupied by the perception they have about this trade. 
According to prior research, the exchange that occurs between consumers and providers can, in 
some cases, leave consumers feeling that they are “losing” the exchange if their information is 




confirmed five of their hypotheses concerning distributive equity i.e. (1) “The higher users’ 
perceived net values, the higher distributive equity perceptions of free data-driven service 
providers.”, this means that users weigh the amount of their form of payment (personal 
information) against what they get in return for the service; (2) “The higher the perceived net 
value of free data-driven service providers, the lower distributive equity perceptions”, this 
means that if the provider's net value (benefits) is perceived to be too high from the users' point 
of view, they will consider that the exchange is not fair; (3) “The relationship between 
provider’s value of personal information and distributive equity is moderated by information 
sensitivity”, this means that users who consider their information sensitive will be more 
susceptible to the monetization of this data, which will influence their perception of fairness; 
(4) “The higher users rate free data-driven service provider’s distributive equity, the higher is 
their satisfaction with the provider”, this means that a user is more likely to be satisfied if the 
service is perceived as a fair exchange between data and service use; and (5) “The higher users 
are satisfied with free data-driven providers, the higher is their continuance intention”, which 
means that satisfaction influences the intention of use of the user (Wagner et al., 2021, p.3 & 
4). Their study was conducted on 200 Facebook users, arbitrarily they were shown a Facebook 
income from their personal data of 38 cents or 98 euros per year, after that a series of questions 
were asked. Thus, this study has shown that users are influenced by the monetization of personal 
data by providers. If this monetization is too high, the user will have a less fair perception of 
the personal information he/she gives compared to what he/she gains from using the service. In 
addition, the sensitivity of the information also influences users' perception of the fairness of 
the exchange. This sensitivity changes from one user to another, typically a person who has 
information that conforms to the norm will be less protective than someone that does not, e.g., 
an overweight person will be less willing to share information about their weight (Wagner et 
al., 2018). The importance of the valuation of personal data has become important because it is 
a form of payment that is often used in the technological industry, some users have become 
aware of this and require a fair remuneration in the form of monetization or services (Wagner 
et al., 2018). 
1.2.3 Non consented data 
Another risk that is possible when the extraction of data occurs is that unconsented data is 
taken from users. As the most used method to collect data is “Incursion into legally and socially 
undefended territory until resistance is encountered” (Zuboff, 2015, p.79) users are not always 




based privacy settings were potentially misleading and ambiguous during a consumer 
protection trial in Arizona (Center, 2020). The lawsuit was filed because Google collected and 
stored location data on mobile devices of users who had disabled location tracking, a violation 
of Arizona's consumer fraud act.  
The types of non-consensual data that are collected are varied, for example: devices that are 
connected and nearby, which can be collected via WIFI access or location; health information 
through online health services or media applications; photos, which can be collected through 
users' social networks; and household income through content consumed online or items 
purchased (Saura et al., 2021). 
1.3 Data analysis 
1.3.1 Definition 
To carry out data analysis, economy of scale is applied by companies such as GAFA 
(Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) so that the cost for analyzing is close to zero even 
though millions of virtual servers are required to increase the computing capabilities (Zuboff, 
2015). In addition to the material, it is also necessary for data scientists to “conduct predictive 
analysis, reality mining, patterns-of-life analysis, and so on” (Zuboff, 2015, p.80). The different 
techniques related to social media big data analysis are (1) natural language processing, which 
analyses the human language used by users; (2) sentiment analysis, which involves identifying 
the sentiment of a specific text so that the analysis indicates whether the underlying sentiment 
is positive, negative or neutral; (3) Social Network Analysis (SNA), which analyses the 
different connections that exist between different users; and (4) news analysis, which is used to 
analyze the different news stories online (Ghani et al., 2019). These different techniques can 
also be used in areas other than social media, for example SNA is often used in the medical 
sector (Ghani et al., 2019). 
1.3.2 Risks 
1.3.2.1 Misuse of analysis by firms 
One phenomenon that has demonstrated how data can be misused by businesses is the case 
of fintech applications in Kenya. Fintech is a technology that allows people to lend a small 
amount of money with a high interest rate (Kiruga, 2020). In order to use fintech applications, 
users must agree to terms and conditions that include sharing phone contacts, location, 




who do not pay back their debts. Shaming is done by sending messages to family, friends and 
colleagues informing them of the user's debt situation (Roussi, 2020). To address the practice 
of some fintech applications, the Kenyan parliament is in the process of issuing a new law so 
that the interest rate can only be changed with the approval of the central bank (Kiruga, 2020). 
 
To protect users’ personal information authorities introduced the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), however, previous research studying the effects of this legislation 
concluded that they were not all beneficial (Aridor et al., 2020). In their research they found 
that the persistence to track customers via cookies increased post-GDPR. To explain this they 
analyzed a hypothesis, “privacy means substitution hypothesis” (Aridor et al., 2020, p.20), 
which means that users who were already privacy protection driven were now able to apply the 
opt-out of data collection GDPR provides. This implies that there is near to no data collected 
about the user. On the other hand, the previous cookie-blocking aids in the browser aren’t used 
anymore. This tool created new cookies/ identifiers every time the customer went on the 
specific website, causing an interference the behavior predicting algorithms because two or 
more profiles were in fact the same person. But now, with the new regulation, there is no data 
stored about this particular customer, allowing the algorithm to be more accurate with behavior 
prediction because it considers one profile for each visitor. There are several economic 
consequences with this hypothesis. Firstly, the people who were already concerned about their 
privacy and now use the opt-out option must analyze the profit they have between pre- and 
post-GDPR.  Secondly, the users who do not use the opt-out and thus do not protect their privacy 
as well as the previously mentioned customers may be disadvantaged by the introduction of 
GDPR. This is due to the more precise behavior predictions, as previously mentioned. 
Ultimately, this would mean that advertisements would be more adapted to each visitor that is 
willing to share their data, increasing the price of placing an advertisement. To support this 
hypothesis, the paper provides evidence about the number of cookies that are used to track one 
user. In the post-GDPR situation this number decreased significantly, which is in line with the 
number of cookies that were created with browser-based privacy tools. The research does not 
identify a proven effect on users who are not using the opt-out options. It could be beneficial if 
companies use the data to adapt advertisements and services to their needs. This could lead to 
pricing users differently according to their online behavior. Nevertheless, privacy-concerned 
users have a positive outcome of the GDPR because their digital footprints are erased and, in 




behavior is used by companies to differentiate the product they offer according to specific user 
profiles and this identification could be even more precise due to the GDPR. 
1.3.2.2 Misuse of analysis by authorities 
An example that can be considered as data misuse by authorities is the social credit system 
used in China. This system allows “points” to be awarded to citizens, the higher the number of 
points, the better it is for the citizen. The system is used to allocate a loan, rent an apartment, 
etc. However, there is no clear indication on how the points are awarded, as the standards are 
defined by business and private interest, but in general, if a citizen commits a crime or does not 
follow the standards, their points decrease (Curran & Smart, 2021). However, it seems that if a 
person buys a video game or if his friends' activities are perceived as bad, this also negatively 
influences the score of this person (Walraven, 2018; Curran & Smart, 2021). Thus, an individual 
with a low social credit score will have difficulties to raise it because the system is not 
transparent. Nonetheless, the system does reduce, or even remove, crime, as it lowers the score 
drastically. But this system has no place for outcasts, because if a person is not part of the 
system, he or she cannot do anything. Moreover, people with a low score will have more 
difficulties to access certain types of resources or social legitimacy, while people with high 
scores will find it easier to continue to prosper in society. Thus, this system widens the gap 
between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, this score could influence dating and marriages if 
it is made available to the public. In addition, this system disadvantages minorities such as 
LGBTQ people or people who are critical of the government because of the entrenched 
traditional values (Curran & Smart, 2021).  
 
Another example is the use of data analysis to better target citizens in the case of elections. 
One instance where this has occurred was the Cambridge Analytica scandal, uncovered in 2018. 
The firm was working in the field of political consulting and was able to collect data through a 
personality test application created by a researcher conducting a study for academic purposes 
(Meridith, 2018). This data was obtained through the app which collected data on the 
respondent as well as all their Facebook friends, who had not given their consent. Through this 
technique, data from more than 87 million Facebook profiles were collected. Cambridge 
Analytica had been accused of influencing the 2016 US presidential elections, using the data 
collected they identified undecided people and targeted them with specific advertisements for 
Ted Cruz’s campaign and later for Donald Trump’s (Meridith, 2018). Facebook was fined 




Cambridge Analytica went bankrupt in May of 2018 (Staff, 2018). The situation raised 
awareness about data privacy and some users even wanted to delete Facebook (Chen, 2018). In 
the end, the Cambridge Analytica scandal was reported as one of the largest data breaches of a 
technology company (Cadwalladr et al., 2018). 
1.4 Solutions to strengthen privacy 
In order to strengthen online privacy, users must first be aware of the dangers of using online 
services. Individuals must therefore understand that these services are not free and that they pay 
with their data (Wagner et al., 2021). Governments could play a role in educating their citizens 
so that they can protect their own online privacy (Walraven, 2018). Once users are aware of the 
exchange they are engaging in, there are several steps they can take to enhance their privacy 
(Walraven, 2018). For example, the user can take advantage of the regulations stemming from 
the GDPR, which was introduced in 2018 to protect data subjects, by managing the various 
cookies on websites and ensuring that the non-essential ones are rejected. Another possibility 
is to use other search engines that collect less data than Google, such as Ecosia or stratpage.com. 
In addition, users should use complicated and long passwords to avoid being hacked. This list 
of steps is not exhaustive. 
 
However, the GDPR, had some unintended consequences regarding competitiveness in some 
sectors. In the web technology provider sector, there has been an increase in market 
concentration which has mainly benefited Facebook and Google, this increase was due to 
websites deciding to work with larger providers because they trusted them more to deliver a 
better-quality product and to better implement GDPR (Johnson et al., 2020). Another sector 
that has been negatively impacted is the ad tech sector, for several reasons; (1) Google benefits 
from its notoriety in user consent; (2) Google benefits from its internal “free data flow” policy 
which gives it an advantage over its competitors as it has a wide range of services to offer ; (3) 
Google benefits from the human and financial resources it has to comply with the GDPR, which 
is not the case for smaller companies; and (4) Google has been able to take advantage of the 
“one-stop shop” which gives it the possibility to deal with complaints with a single Data 
Protection Officer, DPO, in its main establishment in Europe which is located in Ireland, which 
is known to apply the GDPR more flexibly than some DPOs in other countries (Gerandin et al. 
, 2020). Furthermore, the benefits the GDPR brought to data subjects are questionable (Aridor 
et al., 2020), (c.f. 1.4.2.1). The three papers therefore propose to adapt the GDPR to take into 





The Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés, CNIL, which regulates and 
monitors compliance with the various data protection laws in France (CNIL |, n.d.), has 
introduced a new regulation that goes beyond the GDPR. The new regulation had to be adapted 
by the end of March 2021 and ensures that rejecting cookies is as easy as accepting them on 
websites (Reisacher, 2021). As a result of this regulation, some websites offered users two 
options: accept cookies and continue browsing as normal or reject cookies but pay to browse 
the site. Thus, the solution to avoid advertising cookies is to pay. This solution is considered 
legal by the CNIL as long as the amount of money requested is fair (Reisacher, 2021).  
 
Furthermore, several projects have been launched to enable more privacy in the future. For 
example, DECODE, a project funded by the European Commission, aims to find a way to give 
back control of personal data to those who own it in the first place (What Is DECODE, 2017). 
The project was based on data commons, which is a data set that would be of public property; 
decentralized servers, so that the data cannot be easily hacked or manipulated; and blockchain 
with attribute-based cryptography techniques, so that intermediaries are no longer needed 
(Walraven, 2018). Blockchain is a system that allows a record of every purchase and sale of a 
cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin) in the form of blocks, with each occurrence representing one 
block (“BLOCKCHAIN| Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary,” n.d.). Cryptography 
is the practice of encrypting information using certain codes (“CRYPTOGRAPHY| Meaning in 
the Cambridge English Dictionary,” n.d.). The data available in the datasets would be 
voluntarily given by the users. Different pilots were put into place in Amsterdam and Barcelona, 
they offered alternative forms of online social networking and privacy-friendly services. The 
project that ran from 2017 to 2019 allowed them to develop a list of recommendations and 
advice on three levels, namely city, national and European so that the project could be applied 
on a larger scale (Bass & Old, 2020). Another interesting project is the Indienet created by Aral 
Balkan and Laura Kalbag (Fish, 2018), which was a private initiative, they wanted to create a 
web that was not influenced by surveillance capitalism. Surveillance capitalism was defined by 
Zuboff S as “a new form of information capitalism that aims to predict and modify human 
behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control” (Zuboff, 2015, p.75). Here again 
the project is based on decentralized networks, and the social networks would become a public 




2 Theoretical concepts 
The previous section, online data, provided an understanding of why and how data is used. 
It also explained the risks that are associated with the collection, extraction, and analysis of 
data. This next section will explore the privacy paradox that occurs when users engage with 
online services in exchange for their data.  
2.1 Definitions 
The privacy paradox (cf 1.1) observed in the behavior of users has been the subject of several 
studies. According to Berth et de Jong the decision making of the users can be divided into two 
categories: “risk-benefit calculation” and “prevalent benefits and little to no risk assessment”, 
these categories are also divided in sub-categories (2017, p. 1040). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the different theories related to the different categories and subcategories 
established by Berth et de Jong (2017, p. 1041, 1042). Each category and subcategory will be 
explained based on a selected theory and the following sub section will contain a recent article 
that applies the theory to the user context of data-driven businesses.   
2.2 Privacy concerns: theoretical foundations  
The role of rationality, Rational choice theory of human behavior  
Previous research tends to rely on rational choice behavior (Wagner et al., 2021), where there 
is an exchange of data and services online. Users should want the exchange to be positive for 
them, in other words, that the benefit from the service they receive is sufficient relative to the 
risk they take in giving out personal information. However, theories of behavioral economics 
(cf. table 1) show that users' decisions are not always rational and are biased by several factors. 
(Immediate) role of gratification, Hyperbolic discounting theory 
Previous essays have confirmed that hyperbolic discounting theory is one of the biases 
associated with risk-benefit calculations and is applicable in the context of user privacy 
(Waldman, 2020).  Users will be more likely to disregard their online privacy in order to access 
online services, such as contact with online friends and the convenience of easy access to online 
searches, than to protect their data, even if they are aware of the risks involved. Thus, the 
immediate benefits are more important to users than the risk of losing their privacy in the long 




Main category Sub-cluster  Theory Explanation 
Risk-benefit 
calculation 
   This category of the decision-making process reflects the comparison of 
perceived benefits and risks when a consumer uses an application or website.  
 Guided by rationality 
 
 Rational choice theory 
of human behavior 
(Simon, 1955) 
When a decision is guided by rationality, the user will weigh the benefits against 
the risks and make a decision that will be most beneficial to themselves. Thus, 
the utility will be evaluated by taking into account the risk that the individual is 
about to take.   
 Biased risk assessment 
within the risk-benefit 
calculation 
  The calculation of risks and benefits can be confounded by a variety of factors, 
prompting users to base their decision on, for example, experience or trust in the 
ethics of companies using data. 






Hyperbolic discounting theory states that individuals will perceive positive 
short-term effects as more valuable than positive long-term effects, even if the 
long-term effect is more beneficial than the short-term one. There is thus an 
inconsistency in the choices that are made when time is considered because the 
individual in the future will regret what he did in the past if the benefit would 
have been greater. 
  Under-
/overestimation of 
risks and benefits 
 




According to the theory of underinsurance, which was defined by analyzing 
individuals' decisions to insure themselves if they live in disaster-prone areas, 
several aspects influence individuals when estimating risks and/or benefits. 
Individuals may make an incorrect judgment about a situation if they are 
influenced by experience, if they consider what their friends are doing, if they 
lack knowledge about how to protect themselves, if they do not understand the 
likelihood of an event occurring, or if they want to avoid admitting the risk 
situation because they do not want to live in fear. 




Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts that allow individuals to make 
decisions more quickly. Tversky and Kahneman describe three of them, 
“representativeness” which helps one make a decision by comparing the event or 
object that an individual is to evaluate to what he/she already knows, 
“availability” which helps one make a decision based on examples that come 
easily to mind about the subject of the decision, and “adjustment and anchoring” 
which allows one to make a decision based on a certain initial idea and adjust 
from there. However, all three of these heuristics can be biased, for example, 
when the individual is influenced by stereotypes, when examples that come to 
mind are considered more important than information that does not come 








 Difference btw 
the judgements of 






According to Kahnemand and Tversky's prospect theory, decisions are made in 
two phases: editing first, and then evaluating. During the editing phase, people 
set a benchmark to determine what will be considered losses (below the line) and 
gains (above the line). During the evaluating phase, people will value the utility 
of the outcomes of the decisions they have to make based on the baseline 
established in the previous phase. The theory also states that an individual will 
react more harshly if it’s a risk than if it’s a gain. Thus, the way the decision is 
presented will influence the decision an individual makes.  
  Habit 
 
Theory of ritualized 
media use (Rubin, 
1984)  
This theory, based on a study of television viewing, states that media has become 
part of everyday life. Different motivations of users to watch television were 
analyzed and all correlated with habit but viewing for information.  
Little to no 
risk 
assessment 
   In some cases, individuals do not possess or perceive knowledge of the risks 
associated with a decision. In this case, the individual will make the decision 
with little or no consideration of the risks and will base decisions only on the 
perceived benefits. 
 Value of desired goal 
outweighs risk 
assessment 
 Conformity and peer 
group pressure 
(Crutchfield, 1955) 
Peer group pressure ensures that the individual allows himself to be influenced 
by the actions of those within the group in order to feel part of the group. 
 Privacy valuation 
failed 
 
 Public value theory 
(Meynhardt, 2009) 
Public value theory shows that the individual is central and analyses the impact 
of individuals' subjective evaluations and perceptions on social relations. In this 
way, an organization can contribute to the well-being of a society. Thus, this 
theory can help in understanding the evolution of societal obligations and the 
making of values in societies that want to coordinate, legitimize, and give 
meaning to themselves.  
 Knowledge deficiency 
due to incomplete 
information  
 
 Theory of incomplete 
information 
(Harsanyi, 1967) 
The theory of incomplete information shows that an individual is not always 
aware of the values and rules of another or is unaware of some important 




Under-/ overestimation of risks and benefits, Theory of under insurance  
Users often misjudge the benefits and risks, i.e., they do not apply privacy safeguards for 
low probability but high impact risks, such as the one described in 1.5, § 1. This could be due 
to users not fully understanding how their data is collected and/ or not informing themselves by 
not reading the terms and conditions when using a service from a data-driven company (Lee & 
Calugar-Pop, 2020). Alongside this, the effect of experience is observable as previous research 
has shown that willingness to share information changes when a data breach has occurred 
(Johnson, 2021). This shows that the underinsurance theory is effective in the case of user data 
protection, lack of knowledge and reluctance to inquire will have a negative impact on a user's 
data privacy. A change will be observable when the damage has already been done, as was the 
case in Kunreuther's research when individuals took out insurance after two years of flood 
damage (1984). 
Difference between the judgements of risks and benefits, Prospect theory  
Regarding the privacy concern when a user is confronted with data collection, prospect 
theory has been proven to be accurate in previous research (Liao et al., 2020). The willingness 
to share data in order to receive non-monetary services in exchange will vary depending on the 
reference point, when it is high users are more lax in privacy; loss aversion; and risk parameter 
of the users. For example, users with a higher reference point, a high level of loss aversion and 
a low level of risk parameter will be more willing to participate in data collection. Because of 
the high reference point, users will not easily feel the loss of privacy, so the cost of participation 
will decrease, but because their loss aversion is also high, they will be sensitive to the loss of 
potential services if they do not participate. In contrast, users with a higher reference point, low 
loss aversion, and a large risk parameter will be less likely to trade their data for services. This 
is because they perceive the decrease in privacy due to the higher benchmark as less important 
than the gain in privacy if they do not participate. 
The role of Habits, Theory of ritualized media use 
According to the European barometer, 75% of respondents use internet daily and 52% use 
social media daily (Standard Eurobarometer, 2020, p.130-133). These percentages indicate that 
the use of the services offered by data-driven companies have often turned into a habit. The 
definition of a habit is “something that you do often and regularly, sometimes without knowing 





The impact of Heuristics, Cognitive heuristics 
Previous research has shown that heuristics have an influence on how users protect their 
personal information online and this helps to explain the privacy paradox (users that give more 
information than they say they would). A recent paper studied several privacy heuristics and 
identified 12 of them, this list is not exhaustive (Sundar et al., 2020). (1) Authority refers to the 
influence of the name, brand, or organization of the website a user visits; (2) bandwagon is the 
influence of other users of the site/application who have already shared personal information; 
(3) reciprocity represents the influence of another person who has already shared personal 
information with the user; (4) sense-of-community denotes the influence of the community in 
relation to sharing data within the community; (5) community-building represents the influence 
of the desire to build a community by sharing information; (6) self-presentation signifies the 
influence of the user's desire to represent themselves by sharing information; (7) control means 
the influence of the control 'offered' by a site over users' private information; (8) instant 
gratification represents the influence of the speed with which a service is offered when a user 
shares information; (9) transparency is the influence of the transparency that a website gives to 
its users; (10) machine represents the influence of the thought that machines protect personal 
information; (11) publicness represents the influence of the public treatment of information; 
and (12) mobility represents the influence of the users' belief that mobile devices do not process 
information securely. The hypotheses made in the research, “stronger belief in authority, 
bandwagon, reciprocity, sense-of-community, community- building, presentation, control, 
instant gratification, transparency, and machine heuristics will be associated with greater 
disclosure intentions in scenarios featuring cues related to those heuristics.” and “Stronger 
belief in the (g) publicness and (h) mobility heuristics will be associated with negative 
disclosure intentions in scenarios featuring cues related to those heuristics.” (Sundar et al., 
2020, p.3, 4) were confirmed. Thus, mental short cuts that are used to make decisions influence 
the decision-making in the context of online privacy protection.  
Value of desired goal outweighs risk assessment,	Conformity and peer group pressure 
Previous research has shown that users are influenced by the members of a group they want 
to be part of (Sundar et al., 2020). For the privacy protection aspect, this translates into a greater 
willingness of users to share information in order to be part of a group. Users will therefore be 






Privacy valuation failed, Public value theory  
Data privacy needs to be valued if it is to be seen as a public value, this has not always been 
the case, but people are now increasingly aware of it. A 2020 survey by KPMG shows that 87% 
of the 1,000 respondents consider data privacy to be a human right and that users want 
organizations to commit to better protection, management, and ethical use of personal data. 
(The New Imperative for Corporate Data Responsibility, 2020).  
Knowledge deficiency due to incomplete information, Theory of incomplete information 
Users do not have full information about the dangers of privacy disclosure, this was shown 
in previous research (Lulandala, 2020). For example, companies may choose to hide the 
security breaches it has experienced so that they can maintain the trust users have in them. In 
this way, the user does not have complete information to make the right decision (Lulandala, 
2020). This shows that incomplete information has an impact on the choice of a user. 
3 Conceptual model 
In the previous section, different theories on decision making were explained and shown in 
existing research to be applicable to the topic of privacy. They were mainly analyzed in the 
context of private data companies that offer services such as social media or online shopping. 
However, with the emergence of technology over the years, governments are also using IT to 
provide certain services. Examples of government applications and websites in Belgium include 
the eHealth (EHealth, n.d.) website which allows an individual to access their medical records 
online; the Coronalert (Coronalert, n.d.) application which tracks the spread of the coronavirus; 
and Myminfin (MyMinfin, n.d.) which allows an individual to have an overview of their house, 
property and information on payments and reimbursements and which helps them to fill in their 
tax return. The different theories identified above are interesting when applied to government 
applications or websites. The cognitive heuristic of authority that influences users through a 
name, brand, or organization (Sundar et al., 2020) comes into play in this case, as these 
platforms are issued by the government. In this way, we can analyze the privacy paradox in a 
different manner.  
 
The analysis of healthcare-related websites or applications is also an interesting perspective 
to take because, as we saw earlier (c.f. 1.3.2), this information is considered sensitive, and users 
are therefore more likely to protect it. In addition, the health theme is very topical due to the 





Previous research has already analyzed the privacy paradox of government-provided 
healthcare technologies by testing different hypotheses such as “Perceived benefits will 
positively influence acceptance of electronic health record systems”, “health information 
privacy concerns will negatively influence acceptance of electronic health record systems”, 
“Perceived benefits will positively influence intention to adopt mobile-health technologies” 
and “health information privacy concerns will negatively influence to adopt m-health 
technologies” (Fox, 2020, p. 1017). The different biases that were significantly influencing the 
acceptance or continuance of use of the different governmental IT health services were “lack of 
privacy knowledge; underestimation of privacy risks; belief negative outcomes are unlikely; 
overestimating benefits; belief benefits are guaranteed; excessive data request; awareness of 
privacy risks; privacy breach; realization of benefits; and sustained relevance of benefits” (Fox, 
2020, p. 1025). However, this study has some limitations, including the fact that it does not 
analyze the actual adoption and use of the different services as well as the fact that it analyzes 
two different countries (Ireland and the United States) with different electronic health record 
systems. Therefore, the following question is interesting to analyze:  
 
How do the different theories that explain the privacy paradox apply to the 
actual adoption of health technology services issued by the government? 
 
We chose to analyze the risk-benefit calculation that a user makes when using a new website 
or downloading a new government-issued application because health data is sensitive, and users 
are more likely to already know the risks associated to the sharing of their data. Several theories 
were chosen for this analysis: rational choice theory of human behavior, cognitive heuristics, 
theory of under insurance, hyperbolic discounting theory, and theory of ritualized media use. 
The prospect theory will not be applied in this research because of its complexity. The different 
hypotheses that are analyzed in this study are explained in the following section.  
3.1 Hypotheses 
The various hypotheses that have already been proven in the context of data privacy (c.f. 
2.2) will now be placed in the context of data privacy in a healthcare government environment. 
To this extent, each theory will be used to make hypotheses in the case of downloading or using 




3.1.1 Rational choice theory of human behavior 
As explained earlier, users must make a decision whether to download and use an online 
service or not (Berth and de Jong, 2017). Regarding the research question mentioned in the 
previous section, users have to decide on the adoption of government health technology 
services. The decision that users make is based, like any decision that must be made, on 
weighing up the risks and benefits (Simon, 1955). Previous research has confirmed the impact 
of perceived benefits on acceptance of electronic health record system (Sundar et al., 2020). In 
addition, the benefits identified will encourage someone to take the plunge (Simon, 1995), in 
our case the plunge is the adoption of governmental health technology services. Therefore, a 
pertinent hypothesis is the following.  
H1: Perceived benefits will positively influence the adoption of governmental health 
technology services. 
Furthermore, the various risks identified regarding data privacy will lead an individual to 
avoid options that carry many risks (Simon, 1995). The effect of privacy concerns on the 
acceptance of electronic health record systems has already been demonstrated (Fox., 2020), but 
as explained earlier the actual adoption needs to be analyzed. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is made.  
H2: Perceived risks regarding data privacy will negatively influence the adoption of 
governmental health technology services. 
3.1.2 Theory of under insurance 
This theory can be used to understand why individuals don’t take actions to protect 
themselves regarding eventual risks. Two of the reasons being not having enough knowledge 
about the risks and not having experienced the possible risks (Kunreuther, 1984).  
Knowledge 
Not having enough knowledge about how data is collected and how it is used makes users 
less aware of the risks and therefore they do not apply privacy-protective behavior (Lee & 
Calugar-Pop, 2020). It would be logical that the reverse is true, i.e. the more knowledge a user 
has about data processing, the more protective that person will be of their personal data. 
Furthermore, if users do not have sufficient knowledge about the use of online data, they will 
be more likely to consider only the perceived benefits (Lee & Calugar-Pop, 2020). To consider 




H3a: Knowledge about data treatment has a positive influence on the perceived risks of 
using government health technology services. 
H4a: Knowledge about data treatment has a negative influence on the perceived benefits of 
using government health technology services. 
Experience 
Studies have shown that users who have experienced a data breach have more privacy 
concerns (Lulandala, 2020). They are also likely to engage in data protection behavior (Johnson, 
2021). Therefore, they are more likely to concentrate on the possible risks than the benefits of 
using the different platforms (Berth and de Jong, 2017). Analyzing this phenomenon in the case 
of government-delivered health technology services is relevant, as it will allow us to see 
whether data breaches in different platforms influence healthcare platforms.  
H3b Data breach experience has a positive influence on the perceived risks of using 
government health technology services. 
H4b Data breach experience has a negative influence on the perceived benefits of using 
government health technology services. 
3.1.3 Cognitive heuristics 
Testing all twelve heuristics identified in the research of Sundar et al. (2020) will not be 
possible since there are four other theories to test, so there must be a selection based on the 
assumption of what will be observable in the context we chose. The heuristics that are not used 
are reciprocity, sense of community, community-building and self-presentation because they 
cannot be adequately analyzed as other users are unable to check whether an individual is 
sharing personal information as data on government platforms is not made public; instant 
gratification will not be analyzed as a heuristic because hyperbolic discounting theory is more 
appropriate to do so; machine, mobility and publicness are not used because the focus of this 
thesis lies elsewhere. The different heuristics that are used to analyze the adoption of 
governmental issued platforms for healthcare are authority; bandwagon; control; and 
transparency. 
Trust 
The influence of government authority is supposed to inspire confidence in users as 
platforms are issued to make their lives easier, to help them get the right information and, in 
some cases, protect them. For example, the eHealth platform in Belgium was designed to 




privacy of the patient and the caregiver so that medical confidentiality is respected 
(MHealthBELGIUM, n.d.). Therefore, the authority heuristic that inspires trust should 
strengthen perceived benefits and weaken the perceived risks of using government health 
technology services. However, the Winter Eurobarometer shows that in Belgium, 59% of 
respondents tend not to trust the government (Standard Eurobarometer, 2020). Thus, if the 
majority of citizens do not trust the government in Belgium, it is interesting to analyze the 
influence of the lack of trust in the issuing authority of the application or website. We will call 
this variable trust because it reflects the trust citizens have in their government. The hypotheses 
will be the following: 
H3c The lack of trust in the government positively influences the perceived risks of using 
government health technology services. 
H4c The lack of trust in the government negatively influences the perceived benefits of using 
government health technology services. 
Bandwagon 
The bandwagon heuristic shows the influence that other people can have on a person's 
decision (Sundar et al., 2020). Previous research has shown that the bandwagon effect 
encourages users to use Facebook and therefore to ignore the risks associated with using these 
services (Fu et al., 2012). This effect that has been established in the case of social media is 
interesting to test in our case. It is therefore relevant to consider the following hypotheses.  
H1a The negative influence of perceived risks is weaker on the adoption of governmental 
health technology services when users are influenced by other active users. 
Control 
Users can be influenced by the degree of control they have over their data to download or 
use a certain application or website, the more control they have, the safer they feel to share their 
private information (Sunder et al., 2020). To analyze whether this is also valid for our case, the 
following hypothesis is made.  
H1b The negative influence of perceived risks is weaker on the adoption of governmental 
health technology services when users are in control over the data they share. 
Transparency 
The various government platforms such as eHealth or Myminfin contain a lot of information 
about the cookies they use on their website and the data they collect and why (EHealth, n.d.; 
MyMinfin, n.d.). This suggests that transparency is present on these sites. The effect of 




safer to share their information if the privacy policy is transparent (Sundar et al., 2020), however 
this research did not consider the intentions of a specific organization such as a government. It 
is therefore interesting to see whether users' perceptions of the risks of adopting government 
health technologies will be influenced by the transparency of a governmental issued platform. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is pertinent.   
H1c The negative influence of perceived risks is weaker on the adoption of governmental 
health technology services when the government’s privacy policy is more transparent. 
3.1.4 Theory of ritualized media use 
The theory of ritualized media use explains that there are several habit-related reasons why 
a user uses media. This habit may influence users to lower their guard regarding data privacy 
in order to continue to use the media. (Stockdale & Coyne, 2020).  
Habit 
As shown earlier, the use of the internet and social media has become a habit. The influence 
of this habit can make sure that the perceived benefits become more important than the 
perceived risks in case of social media use, so the user will not engage in privacy protecting 
behavior (Debatin et al., 2009). For this research, it is therefore interesting to analyze how the 
use of the internet and apps as a habit can affect the perceived risks and benefits of the adoption 
of governmental health technology services. In this way, we can see whether the user's 
perceived benefits and risks is changed as a result of this habit. The hypotheses to be tested are 
the following.  
H5e The perception of applications as a habit negatively influences the perceived risks of 
using government health technology services. 
H6e The perception of applications as a habit positively influences the perceived benefits of 
using government health technology services. 
3.1.5 Hyperbolic discounting theory 
This theory allows us to analyze how immediate gratifications influence a user's choice 
regarding the downloading or using of governmental issued platforms. So, the understanding 
of the use and the perception of the immediate benefits of this same application will influence 
a user.  
Immediate benefits 
The link between perceived benefits and immediate gratification in the case of social media 




online services, which also reflects less consideration of possible risks (Waldman, 2020). It is 
then interesting to see if this applies to the adoption of government-issued platforms, as some 
platforms do not have immediate benefits. For example, the Covid-19 tracking application only 
has long-term results in terms of the spread of the virus (Rowe, 2020), but the eHealth platform 
provides immediate access to medical records (MHealthBELGIUM, n.d.).  Thus, the following 
hypotheses are relevant for analysis.  
H5d Immediate benefits negatively influence the perceived risks of using government health 
technology services. 
H6d Immediate benefits positively influence the perceived benefits of using government 
health technology services. 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
As a result of the hypotheses made in the previous section, the conceptual model that will be 
discussed in this paper is presented in Figure 1. This model will be tested by conducting a study 








Chapter 3: Research Design  
In the previous chapter, the conceptual model with the different assumptions that derived 
from it was presented. In this chapter this conceptual model will be tested by applying it to two 
cases studies. The case studies are the adoption of the Covid-19 tracing application and the 
Covid-19 certificate application. 
1 Case study 
In order to apply the conceptual model, we first need to understand the two applications 
mentioned above, why they were created, how they work and what concerns users may have 
about them. To begin with we present the tracking application that was introduced in several 
countries to monitor the spread of the pandemic and explain why some citizens were not very 
receptive to this new application. Then we will present the new application that was introduced 
in Belgium, among others, to identify whether a person has a Covid-19 certificate. In addition, 
we will draw up a comparison table between the two applications to analyze the differences and 
similarities.  
1.1 Covid-19 applications  
Since the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2, which is a disease causing “severe acute respiratory 
syndromes” in late 2019, several technology services have been launched, among others, to 
raise awareness of this highly contagious disease and track its spread (Utz et al., 2021, p.1). 
These technologies have often taken the form of apps and have been launched by private and 
public initiatives (Utz et al., 2021). 
1.1.1 Covid-19 tracing application  
Intended use 
In the opinion paper by R.A.Fahey and A. Hino published in 2020, authors explain the two 
different ways in which nations have applied the tracing application for Covid-19. There is the 
“data-first” view, where data is central and the more data that is assembled the better. The 
second is the “privacy-first”, which ensures that when data is collected it remains anonymous 
and cannot be associated with any individual. Both approaches start in the same way, i.e. if a 
person tests positive and this is reported on the application, the people who have been in contact 
with that person will be alerted. However, the data-driven approach allows the authorities to 




and to contact them. Whereas the privacy-based approach simply sends a notification to the 
phone of these people. The data-driven approach also allows authorities to identify clusters, 
which is not the case with the privacy-based approach. The data-driven approach has been used 
in, among others, South Korea, Singapore, the UK, France, Taiwan, China, Iran and Qatar. The 
privacy approach has been adopted, among other, in Germany, Italy, Japan and many US states. 
Apple and Google have created a framework for privacy-based approaches with a decentralized 
technology that have been adopted in several countries because they are technologically 
advanced, avoid problems such as excessive battery consumption and are trusted by a large 
number of citizens (Fahey & Hino). The decentralized technology allows to protect personal 
data, if the data is centralized it allows for data analysis (Meyer, 2021).  
 
In Belgium, they adopted a privacy-first approach by using a decentralized privacy-
preserving proximity tracing, DP-3T, structure. For the “Coronalert” application, the federal 
authority authorized Sciensano to create a database V that monitors the application's operations. 
Database I and II, which are also monitored by Sciensano, and which exist for treatments and 
scientific research in the health field, are separated from V so that no identification is possible. 
The application generates secret keys stored on users' phones that generate ephemeral 
identifiers that are renewed every 10 to 20 minutes. The technique used to renew the identifiers 
every 10 to 20 minutes is the same as for Bluetooth, no location information is used to identify 
potential contamination. The data that is exchanged between the different users is the ephemeral 
IDs of the users, the ephemeral IDs of the other people who make contact, the date, the duration 
of the contact and the signal strength, and this data is saved for 14 days.  The application is 
compatible with other EU Member States, countries that are part of the European Economic 
Area or countries considered to have a sufficiently high data protection policy, as set out in the 
GDPR, that use a DP-3T infrastructure on their applications (Accord de Coopération Entre 
l’État Fédéral, La Communauté Fla- Mande, La Région Wallonne, La Commu- Nauté 
Germanophone et La Commission Communautaire Commune, 2020). When a person tests 
positive for Covid-19, they or a healthcare provider stores an encrypted identifier of their phone 
in the test server (Coronalert, n.d.). The application then checks to see if the test results are 
available on the test server, and if so, sends a notification with the result to the user. If the result 
is positive, the user can decide to download the secret codes that generated the previously 
distributed ephemeral identifiers to the main server, where database V is located. This download 




order to avoid any manipulation error that could be made by a user. The data that is sent to the 
main server cannot be linked to a specific user. Once the secret keys are downloaded, they are 
deleted from the user's phone. If they are not downloaded on the main server, they remain on 
the user's phone for 14 days (Accord de Coopération Entre l’État Fédéral, La Communauté Fla- 
Mande, La Région Wallonne, La Communauté Germanophone et La Commission 
Communautaire Commune, 2020).  
Concerns about the application 
The tracing application that was introduced by several authorities around the world to help 
track the spread of the pandemic was not easily accepted by all citizens. According to previous 
research, a kind of privacy paradox has accompanied the application (Rowe, 2020; Utz et al., 
2021), this paradox occurred with data privacy “versus” health and freedom. One should be 
compromised in favor of the other, but for the application to work properly, three conditions 
are identified in existing literature (Rowe, 2020). The first condition is the accuracy of the 
information about whether a person has the disease or not, but this information cannot be 100% 
accurate as the tests are not totally reliable. The second condition is that people who cross other 
people must all have their smartphones with them, which is not always possible, for example 
at the workplace people often forget their phones in their bags or on their desks. The third 
condition is that a high percentage of smartphone users must have downloaded the 
application, which is not always the case as downloading is not mandatory. The same concern 
was expressed in another paper: although the app helps stop the spread of coronavirus and 
provides a lot of valuable data to authorities and health researchers, it would not work if too 
few people download it (Fey and Hino, 2020). In this paper, it was argued that even in countries 
where downloading the app is mandatory, some people do not use the app or their smartphones 
as they should in order to avoid being “tracked”. Furthermore, the authors announce that such 
a large amount of sensitive data has never been required by the authorities in the past. Therefore, 
some citizens are suspicious and make assumptions, for example, citizens in Minneapolis who 
participated in the Black Life Matters protests thought the police would use the contact tracing 
set up for Covid-19, but this was never the intention. This was a misinterpretation of what a 
safety commissioner said (Mullin, 2020). Other research has also shown that privacy concerns 
can be a barrier to downloading the app for some citizens (Utz et al., 2021). In addition, other 
research has shown that a high level of concern about Covid-19 actually decreases willingness 




1.1.2 Covid-19 certificate - application 
In Europe, the Member States have agreed to introduce a “European digital COVID 
certificate” (EU Digital COVID Certificate, n.d.), which is available since the first of July 2021, 
the main reason being to enable the restoration of free movement in the European union, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. A citizen can obtain this certificate in three different ways: 
by being fully vaccinated, by having a negative PCR test, or by proving that he or she has 
recovered from a previous infection with Covid-19. The different authorities in the Member 
States are responsible for issuing the certificate to citizens, for example via online platforms, 
testing centers or health authorities. The certificate will take the form of a QR code with a 
numeric signature, which will prevent forgery. The digital signature will be specific to the 
issuing organization, such as health authorities or hospitals, and the personal data will be 
secured in a database in each country. The personal data contained in a certificate is date the 
certificate was issued, name, birthdate, information about one or more of the three different 
ways to obtain a certificate, and a unique identifier. The QR code will be available on phone 
and/or paper. There will be no central European database, to verify the certificates the European 
commission developed a gateway, which will not let the personal data through only the validity 
of the certificate will be verified by checking the authority that made the certificate and signed 
it. Thus, each country will have its own database and the personal data will not be shared from 
one country to another (EU Digital COVID Certificate, n.d.).  
 
In Belgium, the authorities have decided to make the certificate available in three different 
ways: through an application, called CovidSafeBE; through the government's existing online 
sites, eHealth and the site depending on where you live; and through post by calling the helpdesk 
specific to certification issuing (Wil Je Reizen Binnen de EU?, n.d.). The CovidSafeBE app is 
separate from Coronalert to continue to guarantee private identity on the latter (Wil Je Reizen 
Binnen de EU?, n.d.). The application was created to facilitate the lives of citizens, so all they 
need is their smartphone and it does not collect data unless the user allows it, the data collected 
is anonymous and allows to improve the performance of the application and make error reports 
(CovidSafeBE, n.d.). To use the application, the user must connect it with his identification to 
the Ehealth platform to transfer the necessary data. As a Flemish organization manages the 
database of vaccines in Belgium, Vaccinet, the application was created by Digitaal Vlaanderen, 
which is the agency responsible for the digitalization of public authorities in Flanders. The 





Tracing app  
(Coronalert, n.d.) 
Certification application  
(Privacy statement Sciensano, 2021) (Privacy disclaimer Vaccinet +, 2020) (CovidSafeBE, n.d.) 
  Test certificate Recovery certificate Vaccination certification 
Date of application launch 30 September 2020 16 June 2021 
How data is collected 
Contact tracing is collected via a 
“Decentralized Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing” (DP-3T), the 
results of the tests from the Sciensano 
database 
From database Sciensano From database Sciensano From database Vaccinet 
Data on app 
Secret keys, own ephemeral IDs, 
ephemeral IDs of others who come in 
contact, date, duration of contact and 
signal strength 
Identity (Id number, 
first- and last name, 
birthdate, and principal 
residence) 
Data about the test (type, 
name, and fabricant) 
Covid-19 variant 
Result of the test 
Place and time of test 
Identity (Id number, first- and 
last name, birthdate, principal 
residence) 
Covid-19 variant person had 
Place and date of first positive 
test 
Identity (Id number, first- and last name, birthdate, principal 
residence) 
Vaccine data (brand, lot number, Vaccine ID) 
Place and time on vaccine 
Creator Sciensano Digitaal Vlaanderen 
Transfer of data 
From the test server to the application 
From one user to another (IDs) 
From a user to the main server (secret 
keys) 
The user can show the QR code of the application to third parties, by doing so the identity and content data of the certificates 
will be given. 
Data about the use of the application and the device can be shared with the device provider. This data does not contain 
information about the certificate. This data sharing is in accordance with the privacy policy of 
https://firebase.google.com/support/privacy. 
Duration of data 
conservation 
All the data on the application is 
automatically erased after 14 days. 
If the secret keys are sent to the main 
server in case of a positive test, the 
keys are immediately deleted from 
the application. 
Test results are kept for 60 days after 
registration. 
The certificates on Sciensano will be kept as long as they are 
valid so that the citizen can access them. The ID number and 
metadata will be kept for 10 years in a log database. 
The data will be available on the application until the 
certificate is no longer valid or if the user deletes the 
application from his phone. 
Certificates will be conserved as long as they are valid so that 
the citizen can have access to them. On vaccinet the data will be 
preserved till the death of the citizen.  
The data will be available on the application until the certificate 
is no longer valid or if the user deletes the application from his 
phone. 





To test the conceptual framework, a questionnaire was developed based on the case studies 
presented in the previous section. To analyze the questionnaire, the obtained data is divided 
into two databases, this way there is a distinct analysis for the two applications: Coronalert and 
CovidsafeBE. This section presents the questionnaire that was used, and the measurement 
scales chosen. Next, there will be an explanation of how we collected the data and who our 
respondents were. 
2.1 Questionnaire  
The approach we chose was a quantitative one, with 160 people responding to our 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is available in Appendix A.  
To start the questionnaire, the respondent had to choose a language, French, Dutch, or 
English. These three languages were chosen because French and Dutch are two national 
languages of Belgium. German was left out because the author is not fluent in this language. 
Next, the respondent was introduced to the subject and purpose of the questionnaire. After that 
there were two filter questions. Firstly, whether the respondent lives in Belgium and secondly, 
whether he or she owns a smartphone. The filter questions were asked so that only people with 
access to Coronalert and CovidsafeBE were considered. If respondents did not answer 
positively to both filter questions, they were directed to the end of the questionnaire. Following 
this, they were asked questions on several themes. That is, trust of the government, data 
treatment, data theft, downloading of applications in general and how they use these 
applications. Then, the Coronalert application was presented. If the respondent had never heard 
of it, he was redirected to the next part of the questionnaire. If he answered in the affirmative, 
he was firstly presented with a hypothetical scenario in which he had to choose between 
downloading Coronalert and stopping the pandemic within a given time frame or not doing so 
and not stopping it. Secondly, questions were asked about the control of data on the application, 
the transparency regarding data treatment of the application, the perceived risks, and benefits 
and finally the adoption of the application. After that, the CovidsafeBE application was 
presented. For this application, the respondent was also asked if he/she knew it or not, otherwise 
he/she was redirected to the last part of the questionnaire. The other questions for CovidsafeBE 






2.2 Data collection 
To collect the data, the questionnaire was posted on Facebook and LinkedIn. The social 
media platforms make it easy to share the questionnaire. Data collection began on July 19 and 
ended on July 22. The survey was conducted using Sphinx, with 160 people completing the 
survey and 135 people remaining after the filter questions. 
2.3 Measurement scales 
To measure the different hypotheses that were established in the previous chapter, several 
measurement scales were used. Multiple items were used to minimize measurement error and 
increase the accuracy of the evaluation. The scales and their sources are listed in Appendix B. 
The majority of the scales follow a 7-point Likert scale. 
2.3.1 Dependent variables 
The conceptual model has several dependent variables. The adoption of the different 
applications is measured using the two-item scale of Gao et al (2011), adapted from Davis 
(1989). The items were originally used to measure the adoption of mobile services but for this 
study they were adapted to the adoption of each of the two applications. Perceived benefits 
were measured separately for the Coronalert application and the CovidsafeBE application as 
they have different benefits. The structure of the measure is based on that of Forsythe et al 
(2006) who assessed the benefits of online shopping. For this study, the benefits were tailored 
to each application and 4 items were used for each application. The perceived risks were 
separated into privacy and performance risks for each application. They were based on the 
scales used by Featherman and Pavlou (2003) who analyzed the risks associated with the use 
of online services. For this study, the privacy and performance risks were adapted to the 
applications with 3 and 5 items respectively.   
2.3.2 Independent variables 
There are several different independent variables that influence the dependent variables. The 
distinction is interesting because it differently influences adoption, perceived risks, and 
perceived benefits (Fox, 2020). The measurement of perceived risks and benefits, which are 
also independent variables concerning the adoption of applications, has been explained above. 
Knowledge was measured by a 6-item scale of Çoklar and Odabasi (2009). The items initially 
measured knowledge about technological operations and concepts, for the purposes of this 




a yes, no, don’t know possibility regarding data theft. Trust was measured using the four-item 
scale of Kastanakis et Balabanis (2012). Immediate benefits were measured using Hardisty et 
al's (2011) choice-based binary comparisons. Initially, the items were used to measure discount 
rates and analyze the difference in choice with losses and gains. For our study, we chose to 
analyze the loss of data by downloading the application. As the benefits of each application are 
different, the immediate benefits were measured separately. For each application people “paid” 
by downloading the application to stop the pandemic or to travel freely again over seven 
different time periods.  Habit was measured with the twelve-item scale of Rebar et al. (2018).  
2.3.3 Moderators 
A moderator is a variable that affects the relationship between two others, so that the effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable changes according to the value or level 
of the moderator (Zidda, 2020). The relation between perceived risks and the application 
adoption should be influenced by moderators following hypothesis H1a, H1b and H1c (c.f. 
3.1.3). Bandwagon was measured using a three-item scale by Kastanakis et Balabanis (2012). 
Initially, it measured the consumption of luxury goods, for the purposes of this study it was 
adapted to app adoption. Transparency was measured using Al-Jabri and Roztocki's (2015) 7-
item scale. The measurement scale was initially used to measure the transparency of enterprise 
resource planning systems, for the purpose of this study it was adapted to the use of Coronalert 
and CovidsafeBE in terms of transparency. In this context, only five of the seven items were 
kept. Control was measured using a three-item scale by Chang et al. (2015) adapted from Xu 
et al. (2011). Initially it measured control over private information on online banking services, 
for the purpose of this study it was adapted to the control over private information on the 
Coronalert application and the CovidsafeBE application.  
2.4 Pre-test  
A pre-test was conducted before launching the questionnaire. This was to see if the 
questionnaire was useable. 5 people were chosen to test the questionnaire. Each person gave 
feedback on the formulation and the understandability of the questions. This taught us that some 
sentences were not clear and had to be adapted, furthermore spelling mistakes were identified 
and corrected. This step also allowed us to identify the average time to fill in the questionnaire, 




2.5 Presentation of the sample 
Our sample consists of 135 people who live in Belgium and own a smartphone. We first note 
that 7 respondents have never heard of Coronalert and 13 have never heard of CovidsafeBE. 
The questionnaire was designed in such a way that these respondents were not asked about the 
application they were not familiar with. For this reason, it is interesting to examine the 
sociodemographics of respondents who are aware of Coronalert and those who are aware of 
CovidsafeBE separately. Thus, the original database of 135 individuals was used to create two 
new ones. One with 128 respondents, to analyze the adoption, perceived benefits, and risks of 
Coronalert and the other with 122 respondents, to analyze the adoption, perceived benefits, and 
risks of CovidsafeBE. It is therefore possible that a respondent from the original database could 
be found in both new databases. 
 
Four socio-demographic questions are asked in the questionnaire: gender, age, education, 
and occupation, this allows us to describe the sample of our questionnaire. Gender is assessed 
by asking the person to choose between “male”, “female” or “other”. Age is assessed by asking 
the respondent to classify him/herself in one of the 9 age categories. Education level is obtained 
by asking to choose between 7 options. Finally, occupation is established by asking participants 
to choose between 10 options, including the "other" option that they must specify. 
Table 3 presents the socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents from both 
databases. We note that the majority of our respondents are female, close to 62% for both 
applications.  The two most represented age categories in our sample are between 19 and 24 
years old and between 51 and 60 years old. To find the average age of the respondents, a new 
variable was created with a minimum of 15.5 and a maximum of 80 years old. The calculated 
average is 36 years old for Coronalert and 37 years old for CovidsafeBE. All respondents have 
completed at least upper secondary school and are generally highly educated as the majority 
have a bachelor’s degree. The majority of respondents are students, which explains the 
overrepresentation of the age category and education level. The second most represented 









  Coronalert CovidsafeBE 
Variable  Freq  % Cum. % Freq % Cum. % 
Coronalert 
awareness 
Aware 128 100.00% - 118   96.72%   96.72% 
Not aware - - - 4     3.28% 100.00% 
CovidsafeBE 
awareness 
Aware 118   92.19%   92.19% 122 100.00% - 
Not aware 10     7.81% 100.00% - - - 
Gender Female   79   61.72%   62.22% 75   61.48%   61.48% 
 Male   49   38.28% 100.00% 47   38.52% 100.00% 
Age 13 – 18 years     2     1.56%     1.56% 1     0.82%     0.82% 
 19 – 24 years   57   44.53%   46.09% 50   40.98%   41.80% 
 25 – 30 years   16 12.50%   58.59% 16   13.11%   54.92% 
 31 – 40 years     4     3.13%   61.72% 5     4.09%   59.01% 
 41 – 50 years     8     6.25%   67.97% 8     6.56%   65.57% 
 51 – 60 years  27   21.09%   89.06% 28   22.95%   88.52% 
 61 – 70 years 12     9.38%   98.44% 12     9.84%   98.36% 
 71 years or more 2     1.56% 100.00% 2     1.64% 100.00% 
Education Higher secondary 22   17.19%   17.19% 22   18.03%   18.03% 
Bachelor 41   32.03%   49.22% 39   31.97%   50.00% 
Master 64   50.00%   99.22% 60   49.18%   99.18% 
PhD 1     0.78% 100.00% 1     0.82% 100.00% 
Occupation Student 52   40.63%   40.63% 45   36.89%   36.89% 
Employee 27   21.09%   61.72% 28   22.9%   59.84% 
Retired 9     7.03%   68.75% 9     7.38%   67.21% 
Civil servant 17   13.28%   82.03% 17   13.9%   81.15% 
Long-term illness 1     0.78%   82.81% 1     0.82%   81.97% 
Self-employed 9     7.03%   89.84% 9     7.38%   89.34% 
Manager 4     3.13%   92.97% 4     3.27%   92.62% 
Currently unemployed 4     3.13%   96.10% 4     3.27%   95.90% 
Disability 3     2.34%   98.44% 3     2.46%   98.36% 
Liberal profession  2     1.56% 100.00% 2     1.64% 100.00% 





Chapter 4: Results 
In this chapter, we will analyze the different variables of our model. First, we will test the 
reliability of the chosen scales. Then, we will perform analysis of variance and correlation tests 
on our variables. Next, the correlations will be analyzed, and a multicollinearity test will be 
performed to ensure that our variables do not have collinearity. Finally, we will analyze the 
explanatory and moderating variables defined in our conceptual framework (c.f. 3.2) to 
determine the influence of these variables on the different dependent variables. This chapter 
will be divided into two parts, Coronalert and CovidsafeBE.  
3 Coronalert 
As a reminder, the database used for Coronalert consists of 128 respondents. 
3.1 Measuring the validity and reliability of scales 
It is important to measure the validity and the reliability of the scales to ensure that our scales 
(c.f. 2.3) represent the expected dimensions. The different items that describe a construct must 
be tested to ensure that the construct is presented correctly, so that the different items converge 
to the same response intensity. In addition, the constructs must be internally consistent (Zidda, 
2020). 
In order to test the validity, i.e. to verify the theoretical dimensionality of the measurement 
scales, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is performed. Two steps must be undertaken 
(Zidda, 2020): 
- The factor pattern table should be analyzed so that items have a correlation greater 
than 0.5 to be a relevant descriptor of the factor. This means that items with a value of 
less than 0.5 should be eliminated. 
- The final communality estimates, which represent the percentage of the variance of 
the factor by the item, should have a value higher than 0.5. Anything less than this 
should be deleted and the EFA analysis should start over. 
To measure the reliability, Cronbach's alpha is used, which gives a result between 0 and 1. 
The higher the value of α, the more correlated the items are and therefore the internal 
consistency is good. For α to be deemed valid, it must be equal to or greater than 0.70. If 
Cronbach's alpha is between .80 and .90, it is considered ideal (Stephanie, n.d.).  
The steps described were applied and are available in the Appendix D. The table 4 below 




valid, the measures used are computed based on the averages which are described in the next 
section. 




Trust 1. I trust my government. 
2. The Belgian government makes truthful claims. 
3. The Belgian government is honest. 
4. I do not believe what the Belgian government tells me. 
3 0.935850 
Knowledge 1. I can explain how data treatment on applications operate. 
2. I can use data treatment in different ways. 
3. I can define data treatment used on applications. 
4. I can do basic things regarding data treatment. 
5. I can explain general concepts related to data treatment. 
6. I can use data treatment effectively. 
6 0.961248 
Bandwagon 1. How likely is it that you would download applications used by most people?  
2. How likely is it that you would download applications that everyone would approve of? 
3. How likely is it that you would download applications recognized by many people? 
3 0.901338 
Habit 1. I do frequently.  
2. I do automatically.  
3. I do without having to consciously remember. 
4. That makes me feel weird if I do not do it. 
5. I do without thinking. 
6. That would require effort not to do it. 
7. That belongs to my (daily, weekly, monthly) routine. 
8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it.  
9. I would find hard not to do.  
10. I have no need to think about doing. 
11. that’s typically ‘me’.  
12. I have been doing for a long time. 
8 0.938326 
Control 1. I believe I have control over who can get access to my personal information collected by 
Coronalert 
2. I think I have control over what personal information is released by the Coronalert application 
3. I believe I have control over how personal information is used by the Coronalert application 
3 0.937951 
Transparency 1. The Coronalert application allows me to track my activities  
2. Coronalert provides information on the rules and regulations of the application 
3. Coronalert provides information about the decisions and actions of the application 
4. Coronalert disseminates information on the performance of the application 




1. I will be informed if I have been in contact with a person who has tested positive for Covid-19 
2. I will help to track the spread of the Covid-19 virus 
3. On the long term I will help to stop the spread of the Covid-19 virus 




1. What are the chances that using the Coronalert application will cause you to lose control over 
privacy of your location?  
2. My downloading and using of the Coronalert application would lead to a loss of privacy for me 
because my personal information would be used without my knowledge  
3. Internet hackers (criminals) might steal my private information if I used the Coronalert 
application   
3 0.834305 
Adoption 1. Assuming I have access to the Coronalert application, I intend to download it.  
2. Given that I have access to the Coronalert application, I predict that I would download it.  
2 0.987243 








3.2 Differences between the means 
Variable Average Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Experience 0.2188 0.4150 0 1 
Trust 3.6017 1.3115 1 7 
Habit 2.9981 1.3912 1 7 
Bandwagon 2.4922 1.1075 1 7 
Knowledge 4.0313 1.5778 1 7 
Respondents who would never download Coronalert 0.1484 0.3569 0 1 
Respondents who would download Coronalert if the benefits were noticeable in one month or less 0.0703 0.2567 0 1 
Respondents who would download Coronalert even if benefits are on the long term 0.7813 0.4150 0 1 
Control regarding personal data on Coronalert 4.6328 1.3727 1 7 
Transparency regarding data treatment on Coronalert 3.5430 1.0519 1 7 
Perceived risks regarding data privacy on Coronalert 3.3906 1.2466 1 7 
Perceived benefits of Coronalert 3.0664 1.1749 1 7 
Adoption of the Coronalert application 3.8359 1.9981 1 7 
Table 5: Coronalert means comparison 
Firstly, it is interesting to analyze table 5. As a reminder, the scales calculated were with a 
7-point differential semantic scale, ranging from 1 “Strongly Agree” to 7 “Strongly Disagree” 
or ranging from 1 “Highly probable” to 7 “Highly improbable”. The means that are colored in 
green present the variables that were created (trust, habit, bandwagon, knowledge, control, 
transparency, perceived risks, perceived benefits, and adoption) with the average of the items 
in each dimension. The majority of the variables are below four (neutral), indicating that the 
majority of respondents agree with what was presented to them. However, the majority is also 
very close to four, indicating that respondents are often neutral in their responses. They 
generally trust the government, they recognize that using apps is a habit, they are influenceable 
when it comes to what the majority uses or downloads as applications, they feel that the 
Coronalert app is transparent in terms of data treatment, and they agree with the benefits the 
app provides. They also more or less agree with the perceived risks the app represent regarding 
data privacy, however this score is very close to neutral. They tend not to believe that the app 
provides control over personal data, as the score is close to five (rather disagree). The 
knowledge that respondents have about data processing is considered neutral as the average is 
very close to four (neutral). Furthermore, the score for the adoption of Coronalert is also very 
close to neutral. In addition, the standard deviations are low, showing that the values do not 
deviate much from the mean. 
 
Furthermore, the variables colored in orange are independent variables that were not 




who has had an experience with data theft and is aware of it has a value of one and anyone who 
has not had an experience or is not aware of it has a value of zero. As can be seen, the majority 
of respondents have not had experience with data theft. The immediate benefits were adapted 
to a categorical variable and then transformed into three dichotomous variables so that the mean 
and standard deviation could be analyzed. If the respondent does not want to download the app, 
they are placed in category 1, if the respondent agrees to download the app if the benefits are 
noticeable in one month or less, they are placed in category 2, and if the respondent agrees to 
download the app even if the benefits are only noticeable in the long term (more than one 
month), they are placed in category 3. We find that the majority of respondents are in category 
3. 
 
Secondly, we performed analyses of variance (ANOVA) for categorical sociodemographic 
variables and correlation tests for numerical sociodemographic variables. These tests can be 
found in the Appendix E. Each sociodemographic variable was analyzed with each dependent 
variable, i.e., adoption, perceived benefits, and perceived risks. We find that being female, or 
male, does not have a significant impact on any of the dependent variables. Education and 
occupation also have no significant impact on the dependent variables. Age, on the other hand, 
has a significant impact on the perceived benefits but not on the other two. The correlation 
between perceived benefits and age is 0.18004, meaning that if the age increases, the coefficient 
of perceived benefits also increase, which means that the perceived benefits decrease if age 
increases. To test among which age categories the means are significantly different an ANOVA 
test is performed using the original variable that measures age, which is a categorical variable 
with 8 different categories (0= 13-18 years old, 1= 19-24 years old, 2= 25-30 years old, 3= 31-
40 years old, 4= 41-50 years old, 5= 51-60 years old, 6=61-70 years old, 7= 71+). The details 
of these results are available in appendix E.3 under perceived benefits. There is a significant 
difference between the means of age categories 6 and 1 and age categories of 6 and 2. The 
means of the perceived benefits differ of 1.2171 and 1.4844 respectively.  
3.3 Correlation test and multicollinearity test 
First, a correlation analysis is performed to analyze the relationship between the different 
variables and to see if there is collinearity between the different explanatory variables. The 
correlation matrix is presented in the Appendix F. For a correlation to be considered significant, 
its p-value must be less than 0.05. The correlation coefficient (r) has a value between -1 and +1. 




means that the relationship between the variables is negative, if it is positive, it is the opposite. 
Furthermore, r is considered high when it is greater than 0.50, medium when it is between 0.30 
and 0.50 and low when it is less than 0.30 (Leard statistics, 2020). By analyzing the correlation 
matrix, perceived risks and trust are negatively correlated (-0.37). Knowledge is also negatively 
correlated with perceived risks (-0.20), however, the correlation is weak. Next to that, perceived 
risks are negatively correlated with adoption (-0.48). In addition, trust is positively correlated 
with perceived benefits (0.40). Moreover, perceived benefits are positively correlated with 
adoption (0.29). Finally, none of the explanatory variables were highly correlated with each 
other.  
Secondly, a multicollinearity test was performed (SAS Institute Inc., n.d.), the analysis is in 
the Appendix G. The conditions to be met are the tolerance values must be greater than 0.1 and 
the difference of the coefficients of the eigenvalue column and the condition index column 
cannot differ much (Schreiber-Gregory & Jackson, 2017). No multicollinearity was identified, 
which allows us to move on to the next step, hypothesis analysis. 
3.4 Hypotheses results 
To be able to test the hypotheses that were established in chapter two (c.f. 3.1) three main 
models are used to perform multiple linear regressions. The first one analyses the explanatory 
variables, perceived benefits, and perceived risks (X), on the dependent variable, app adoption 
(Y). To do this, a top-down approach is applied, starting with a full model that analyzes all 
variables and then eliminating all non-significant variables, the coefficients and R-squared are 
then compared to analyze the evolution. Each variable is also tested independently on the 
dependent variable. Each regression has two control variables: age and gender, to estimate the 
causal effect of X on Y, however these variables will not be interpreted so that the focus remains 
on the variables of interest (Hünermund & Louw, 2020). The details of the regressions are 
available in Appendix H and the summary of the regressions are available in table 6, 7, and 8. 
To test the categorical variable immediate benefits, ANOVA tests have been performed, 
details are available in Appendix E.1. 
To analyze hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c Hayes’ process macro was used. This technique 
was designed by Andrew F. Hayes to easily effectuate moderation and mediation analyses 






H1 and H2 
Variables Full model; R2Aj= 0.2434 Reg with only perceived 
benefits; R2Aj= 0.0623 
Reg with only perceived 













Intercept 5.54122  2.36377  6.62025  
p <.0001 p <.0001 p <.0001 
Perceived 
benefits 
0.32287 0.18985 0.49665 0.29203 
 






p <.0001 p <.0001 
Age -0.00695 -0.06113 -0.00256 -0.02252 0.00901 -0.03289 
p = 0.4393 p = 0.7970 p = 0.6789 
Gender -0.04606 -0.01125 0.06827 0.01667 0.32297 -0.00009332 
p = 0.8850 p = 0.8470 p = 0.9991 
Table 6: Coronalert regression H1 and H2 
Analyzing the multiple linear regression of hypotheses one and two, we find that the 
coefficient of perceived benefits has a positive sign and is significant (at the 5% level), meaning 
that if perceived benefits increase by one unit, Coronalert adoption increases by 0.32287. The 
value of perceived risks is also significant, but the sign of the coefficient is negative, meaning 
that if perceived risks increase by one unit, Coronalert adoption decreases by 0.44431. Looking 
at the other two models that represent the model with one independent variable at a time, the 
coefficients for perceived benefits and perceived risks increase slightly but the change is very 
small.  Looking at the R-squared of the model with perceived risks, the variation in Coronalert 
adoption is explained at 21.58% while the model with only perceived benefits explains only 
6.23% of this variation. Thus, the independent variable that has the greatest impact on adoption 
is perceived risk, which can also be seen by the coefficient in the full model. Risk and perceived 
benefit explain 24.34% of the variation in Coronalert adoption. 
H4 and 6 




Reg with only 
Trust; R2Aj= 0.1791 
Reg with only 
Knowledge 
Reg with only Habit 
 Param 
estimate  
















Intercept 1.12316  
Model not 




significant, p = 
0.1150 
Model not 
significant, p = 
0.1435 
p = 0.0061 p = 0.0004 
Experience 0.01472 0.00520 
 
p = 0.9504 
Trust 0.35902 0.40078 0.36398 0.40631 
p <.0001 p <.0001 
Knowledge 0.02682 0.03602 
 
p = 0.6778 
Habit 0.06372 0.07545 
 
p = 0.4487 
Age 0.00955 0.14298 0.01277 0.19115 
p = 0.1505 p = 0.0191 




p = 0.9936 p = 0.9264 
Table 7: Coronalert regression H4 and H6 
The model used to analyze part of hypotheses four and six has only one independent variable 
that is significant (at the 5% level). The trust that people have in their government positively 
influences perceived benefits, i.e. if trust increases by one, perceived benefits will increase by 
0.40078. Looking at the model without the insignificant variables, thus keeping only trust and 
the control variables, we can see that the R-squared increases from 16.43% to 17.91%, meaning 
that the variation in perceived benefits is explained at 17.91% in the second case. The other 
regressions where non-significant variables are tested are not significant and therefore cannot 
be interpreted. 
In order to test if immediate benefits have an impact on the perceived benefits an ANOVA 
test was run, the details can be seen in Appendix E.1. Immediate benefits is a categorical 
variable where 1= Never download the app, 2= Download when benefits are available in 1 
month or less, 3= Download when benefits are available on the long term. There is a significant 
difference between the means of categories 2 and 3 and categories of 1 and 3. The means of the 
perceived benefits differ of 1.1094 and 1.0334 respectively. Which means that respondents of 
categories one and two perceive less benefits than respondents of category three.  
H3 and 5 




Reg with only Trust; 
R2Aj= 0.1338 
Reg with only 
Knowledge 





















Intercept 5.31120  
Model not 




significant, p = 
0.0899 
Model not 
significant, p = 
0.3862 
p <.0001 p <.0001 
Experience -0.04134 -0.01376 
 
p = 0.8720 
Trust -0.33208 -0.34938 -0.34909 -0.36728 
p <.0001 p <.0001 
Knowledge -0.09857 -0.12476 
 
p = 0.1605 
Habit -0.01910 -0.02132 
 
p = 0.8339 
Age -0.00764 -0.10783 -0.00992 -0.13994 
p = 0.2876 p = 0.0930 
Gender 0.02687 0.01052 -0.04541 -0.01778 
p = 0.9041 p = 0.8325 
Table 8: Coronalert regression H3 and H5 
To analyze hypotheses three and five a multiple linear regression was run. The results are 
summarized in the table 8 above. Again, only one independent variable can be considered 
significant (at the 5% level). The sign of this variable is negative, meaning that if trust increases 




without the other non-significant ones and with the control variables, the coefficient increases 
a bit. The R-squared also increases and this model explains 13.38% of the variation in perceived 
risks. The other regressions where non-significant variables are tested are not significant and 
therefore cannot be interpreted. 
Immediate benefits were tested using an ANOVA test, the details of which are presented in 
the Appendix E.1. There is a significant difference between the means of categories three and 
one. The means of perceived risks differ by 1.2340. This means that respondents who download 
the app if the benefits are available on the long term perceive less risk on average than those 
who never download it. 
H1a, H1b and H1c 
The moderation analysis effectuated on the relation between perceived risks and adoption 
did not indicate that transparency, control, or bandwagon had to be considered as moderators 
as is shown in Appendix I.  Because of this result, regressions were run to see if the three 
variables could be considered as independent variables regarding adoption. This is the case for 
transparency and control. For the regression with transparency as X and adoption as Y, the R-
squared is of 0.0924, which means that 9.24% of the variation in adoption can be explained by 
the transparency on the app. Furthermore, if transparency increases by one unit, the adoption 
increases by 0.65204. For the regression with control as X and adoption as Y, the R-squared is 
of 0.2008, which means that 20.08% of the variation in adoption can be explained by the control 
user has over the personal data on the app. Furthermore, if control increases by one unit, the 
adoption increases by 0.11685. 
4 CovidsafeBE 
As a reminder, the database used for CovidsafeBE consists of 122 respondents. 
4.1 Measuring the validity and reliability of scales 
To measure the validity and reliability of the scales, the same stepwise design as for the 
Coronalert application was applied (c.f. 1.1). 
The steps described were applied and are available in the Appendix K. The table 9 below 
shows the result of the items that should be kept. Once the scales are considered reliable and 










Trust 1. I trust my government. 
2. The Belgian government makes truthful claims. 
3. The Belgian government is honest. 
4. I do not believe what the Belgian government tells me. 
3 0.936379 
Knowledge 1. I can explain how data treatment on applications operate. 
2. I can use data treatment in different ways. 
3. I can define data treatment used on applications. 
4. I can do basic things regarding data treatment. 
5. I can explain general concepts related to data treatment. 
6. I can use data treatment effectively. 
6 0.961373 
Bandwagon 1. How likely is it that you would download applications used by most people?  
2. How likely is it that you would download applications that everyone would approve of? 
3. How likely is it that you would download applications recognized by many people? 
3 0.906374 
Habit 1. I do frequently.  
2. I do automatically.  
3. I do without having to consciously remember. 
4. That makes me feel weird if I do not do it. 
5. I do without thinking. 
6. That would require effort not to do it. 
7. That belongs to my (daily, weekly, monthly) routine. 
8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it.  
9. I would find hard not to do.  
10. I have no need to think about doing. 
11. that’s typically ‘me’.  
12. I have been doing for a long time. 
8 0.934800 
Control 1. I believe I have control over who can get access to my personal information collected by 
CovidsafeBE 
2. I think I have control over what personal information is released by the CovidsafeBE 
application 
3. I believe I have control over how personal information is used by the CovidsafeBE application 
3 0.949304 
Transparency 1. The CovidsafeBE application allows me to track my activities  
2. CovidsafeBE provides information on the rules and regulations of the application 
3. CovidsafeBE provides information about the decisions and actions of the application 
4. CovidsafeBE disseminates information on the performance of the application 




1. I have my certificate available on my phone 
2. I can use the application to travel easily 
3. I will always have my certificate at hand 




1. What are the chances that using the CovidsafeBE application will cause you to lose control 
over privacy of your medical records?  
2. My downloading and using of the CovidsafeBE application would lead to a loss of privacy for 
me because my personal information would be used without my knowledge  
3. Internet hackers (criminals) might steal my private information if I used the CovidsafeBE 
application   
3 0.875512 
Adoption 1. Assuming I have access to the CovidsafeBE application, I intend to download it.  
2. Given that I have access to the CovidsafeBE application, I predict that I would download it.  
2 0.975857 
Table 9: CovidsafeBE EFA analysis 
4.2 Differences between the means 
Variable Average Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Experience 0.2131 0.4112 0 1 
Trust 3.5547 1.2667 1 7 
Habit 3.0277 1.3860 1 7 




Knowledge 3.9973 1.5856 1 7 
Respondents who would never download CovidsafeBE 0.0902 0.2876 0 1 
Respondents who would download CovidsafeBE if the benefits were noticeable in one 
month or less 
0.0574 0.2335 0 1 
Respondents who would download CovidsafeBE even if benefits are on the long term 0.8525 0.3561 0 1 
Control regarding personal data on Coronalert 4.3361 1.3205 1 7 
Transparency regarding data treatment on CovidsafeBE 3.6940 1.0406 1 7 
Perceived risks regarding data privacy on CovidsafeBE 3.7678 1.3222 1 7 
Perceived benefits of CovidsafeBE 2.2111 1.2535 1 7 
Adoption of CovidsafeBE 2.3648 1.6615 1 7 
Table 10: CovidsafeBE means comparison 
Following the same structure as the interpretation of the Coronalert application, we firstly 
analyze table 10. As a reminder, the scales calculated were with a 7-point differential semantic 
scale, ranging from 1 “Strongly Agree” to 7 “Strongly Disagree” or ranging from 1 “Highly 
probable” to 7 “Highly improbable”. The means that are colored in green present the variables 
that were created (trust, habit, bandwagon, knowledge, control, transparency, perceived risks, 
perceived benefits, and adoption) with the average of the items in each dimension. The majority 
of the variables are below four (neutral), indicating that the majority of respondents agree with 
what was presented to them. However, the majority is also very close to four, indicating that 
respondents are often neutral in their responses. They generally trust the government, they 
recognize that using apps is a habit, they are influenceable when it comes to what the majority 
uses or downloads as applications, they feel that the CovidsafeBE app is transparent in terms 
of data treatment, and they agree with the benefits the app provides. The score of the perceived 
risks is close to four which means that the majority have no opinion on the risks regarding data 
privacy. They tend not to believe that the app provides control over personal data, but this score 
is very close to four (neutral). The knowledge that respondents have about data processing is 
considered neutral as the average is very close to four (neutral). Finally, the score for the 
adoption of CovidsafeBE is rather high, close to two which means that they intend to download 
the app. In addition, the standard deviations are low, showing that the values do not deviate 
much from the mean. 
Furthermore, the variables colored in orange are independent variables that were not 
calculated using a 7-point Likert scale. As shown, the majority of respondents have not had 
experience with data theft. Additionally, most of the respondents agree to download the app 
even if the benefits are only noticeable in the long term. 
 
Secondly, we performed analyses of variances (ANOVA) for categorical sociodemographic 




found in the Appendix L. Each sociodemographic variable was analyzed with each dependent 
variable, i.e., adoption, perceived benefits, and perceived risks. We find that being female, or 
male, has no significant impact on the dependent variables. Age does not have a significant 
impact on adoption and perceived risks. Education has no significant impact on perceived 
benefits and perceived risks. Occupation had no impact on adoption and perceived risks.  
Age has a significant impact on perceived benefits. The correlation between the two 
variables is 0.25146, meaning that as age increases, perceived benefits also increase. To test 
between which age categories the means are significantly different an ANOVA test is 
performed using the original variable that measures age, which is a categorical variable with 8 
different categories (0= 13-18 years old, 1= 19-24 years old, 2= 25-30 years old, 3= 31-40 years 
old, 4= 41-50 years old, 5= 51-60 years old, 6=61-70 years old, 7= 71+). The details of these 
results are available in Appendix L.3 under the variation perceived benefits, there is a 
significant difference between the means of age categories 7 and 2 of 2.9844, between 7 and 5 
of 3.2500, between 7 and 1 of 3.4350, and between 7 and 3 of 3.5250.  
The ANOVA test between education (0= Higher secondary, 1= Bachelor, 2=Master, 3=PhD) 
and adoption is significant (see Appendix L.4). To analyze the differences between the different 
categories, a Tukey posthoc test is performed. The differences between category three and one, 
three and two, and three and zero are significant. The differences in means are 4.2179, 4.8583, 
and 4.9773, respectively. This means that, respondents who do not have a PhD have a higher 
intention to adopt CovidsafeBE than those who have one. The rather big difference in means is 
understandable because among the respondents, only one person has a PhD, and that person 
does not intend to download or use CovidsafeBE. 
Occupation (0=Student, 1= Employee,2 =Retired ,3=Civil servant, 4= Long-term illness, 5= 
Self-employed, 6= Manager, 7= Currently unemployed, 8= Disability, 9= Liberal profession) 
has a significant impact on perceived benefits as can be seen in Appendix L.5. Tukey’s posthoc 
test revealed that there were several groups that had significantly different means. The 
difference between current unemployed and students is 2.0167, between current unemployed 
and employees is 2.1071, between current unemployed and government employees is 2.1471, 
between retired respondents and students is 1.5722, between retired respondents and employees 
is 1.6627, and between retired respondents and government employees is 1.7026. Other 




4.3 Correlation test and multicollinearity test 
To analyze the correlation matrix the same conditions as what was used with Coronalert (c.f. 
1.3) are applied here. The correlation matrix is available in Appendix M. We note that perceived 
risks and trust are negatively correlated (-0.45). Knowledge is also negatively correlated with 
perceived risks (-0.23) however, the correlation is weak. Next to that, perceived risks are 
negatively correlated with adoption (-0.32). In addition, trust and habit are weakly positively 
correlated with perceived benefits (0.24 and 0.30 respectively). Moreover, perceived benefits 
are highly positively correlated with adoption (0.71). Finally, none of the explanatory variables 
were highly correlated with each other.  
Secondly, a multicollinearity test was performed (SAS Institute Inc., n.d.), the analysis is 
available in Appendix N. The conditions to be met are the tolerance values must be greater than 
0.1 and the difference of the coefficients of the eigenvalue column and the condition index 
column cannot differ much (Schreiber-Gregory & Jackson, 2017). No multicollinearity was 
identified, which allows us to move on to the next step, hypothesis analysis. 
4.4 Hypotheses results 
To be able to test the hypotheses that were established in chapter two (c.f. 3.1) the same 
structure was applied as for Coronalert. The details of the different regressions are available in 
Appendix O. and the summary of the regressions are available in table 11, table 12, and table 
13. 
To test the categorical variable immediate benefits, ANOVA tests have been performed, the 
details are available in Appendix L.1. 
To analyze hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c Hayes’ process macro was used. This technique 
was designed by Andrew F. Hayes to easily effectuate moderation and mediation analyses 
(Hayes, 2017). The results are available in Appendix P.   
H1 and H2 
Variables Full model; R2Aj= 0.5219 Reg with only perceived 
benefits; R2Aj= 0.4895 
Reg with only perceived 













Intercept 1.46569  0.36473  3.34867  
p = 0.0025 p = 0.2409 p <0.0001 
Perceived 
benefits 
0.90272 0.68107 0.94618 0.71386 
 






p = 0.0033 p = 0.0007 
Age -0.00427 -0.04520 -0.00156 -0.01655 0.00965 0.10223 




Gender -0.02416 -0.00711 -0.05454 -0.01604 0.16433 0.04833 
p = 0. 9107 p = 0.8063 p = 0.5781 
Table 11: CovidsafeBE regression H1 and H2 
Analyzing the multiple linear regression of hypotheses one and two, we find that the 
coefficient of perceived benefits has a positive sign and is significant (at the 5% level), meaning 
that if perceived benefits increase by one unit, CovidsafeBE adoption increases by 0.68107. 
The value of perceived risks is also significant, but the sign of the coefficient is negative, 
meaning that if perceived risks increase by one unit, CovidsafeBE adoption decreases by 
0.19478. Looking at the other two models that represent the model with one independent 
variable at a time, the coefficients for perceived benefits and perceived risks increase but the 
change is small.  Looking at the R-squared of the model with perceived risks, the variation in 
CovidsafeBE adoption is explained at 9.53% while the model with only perceived benefits 
explains 48.95% of this variation. Thus, the independent variable that has the greatest impact 
on adoption is perceived benefits, which can also be seen by the coefficient in the full model. 
Risk and perceived benefit explain 52.19% of the variation in Coronalert adoption. 
H4 and 6 
Variables Full model; R2Aj= 
0.1162 
Reg with only 
Experience; R2Aj= 
0.0464 
Reg with only 
Trust; R2Aj= 0.0982 
Reg with only 
Knowledge; R2Aj= 
0.0561 
Reg with only 
Habit; R2Aj= 0.0808 
 Param 
estimate  
















Intercept 0.3471  1.4650  0.6812  1.1821  1.1591  
p = 0.4395 p < 0.0001 p = 0.0925 p = 0.0014 p = 0.0003 
Experience -0.1500 -0.0492 -0.0974 -0.0319 
 
  
p = 0.5779 p = 0.7220 
Trust 0.2265 0.2289 
 
0.2278 0.2302   
p = 0.0114 p = 0.0097 
Knowledge 0.0450 0.0569 
  
0.0855 0.1081  
p = 0.5362 p = 0.2475 
Habit 0.1992 0.2202 
  
 0.2104 0.2326 
p = 0.0441 p = 0.0350 
Age 0.0071 0.1003 0.0174 0.2439 0.0176 0.2475 0.0163 0.2291 0.0076 0.1071 
p = 0.3533 p = 0.0073 p = 0.0050 p = 0.0121 p = 0.3290 
Gender 0.0654 0.0255 0.1888 0.0736 0.0972 0.0379 0.1241 0.0484 0.2104 0.0820 
p = 0.7775 p = 0.4109 p = 0.6664 p = 0.5985 p = 0.3496 
Table 12: CovidsafeBE regression H4 and H6 
The model used to analyze part of hypotheses four and six has two independent variable that 
are significant (at the 5% level). The trust that people have in their government positively 
influences perceived benefits, i.e., if trust increases by one, perceived benefits will increase by 
0.40078. The habit of using phone applications also has a positive influence on perceived 




regressions of each independent variable separately, they all have a significative impact on 
perceived benefits. The coefficients do not increase a lot when comparing to the full model. 
The R-squared of each regression with one independent variable is smaller than the full model. 
Which means that experience, trust, knowledge, and habit explain by 11,62% the variation of 
the perceived benefits.  
The categorical variable of immediate benefits was tested using an ANOVA test, the details 
of which are presented in Appendix L.1. There is a significant difference between the means of 
categories 1 and 2 and categories of 1 and 3. The means of the perceived benefits differ by 
1.7143 and 1.9832, respectively. This means that respondents who would never download 
CovidSafeBE, regardless of when the benefits are available, perceive less benefits than those 
who download the app if the benefits are available on the short or long term.   
H3 and 5 
Variables Full model; R2Aj= 
0.2425 
Reg with only 
Experience; R2Aj= 
0.0508 
Reg with only 
Trust; R2Aj= 0.2261 
Reg with only 
Knowledge; R2Aj= 
0.0603 





















Intercept 6.1452  4.4611  5.8393  4.8034  
Model not 
significant, p = 
0.2174 
p < 0.0001 <.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
Experience -0.3813 -0.1186 -0.6352 -0.1976 
 
 
p = 0.1489 p = 0.0289 
Trust -0.43896 -0.4205 
 
-0.4842 -0.4639  
p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
Knowledge -0.1234 -0.1480 
  
-0.1915 -0.2297 
p = 0.0842 p = 0.0148 
Habit 0.0276 0.0289 
  
 
p = 0.7732 
Age -0.0146 -0.1941 -0.0157 -0.2090 -0.0142 -0.1894 -0.0113 -0.1503 
p = 0.0538 p = 0.0208 p = 0.0197 p = 0.0963 
Gender 0.3581 0.1324 0.0490 0.0181 0.2974 0.1099 0.2485 0.0918 
p = 0.1149 p = 0.8392 p = 0.1785 p = 0.3172 
Table 13: CovidsafeBE regression H3 and H5 
To analyze hypotheses three and five, a multiple linear regression was run. The results are 
summarized in the table 13 above. Only one independent variable can be considered significant 
(at the 5% level). The sign of this variable is negative, meaning that if trust increases by one 
unit, the perceived risks will decrease by 0.4205. When this variable is analyzed without the 
other non-significant variables and with the control variables, the coefficient increases slightly. 
However, the R-squared does not increase, the full model has a higher R-squared. This means 
that experience, trust, knowledge, and habit explain 24.25% of the variation of perceived risks. 
The regressions that consider experience and knowledge separately are significant and each 




increases by one unit, the perceived risks decrease 0.1976 and if knowledge increases by one 
unit, the perceived risks decrease by 0.2297. However, the R-squared of 0.0508 and 0.0603 
respectively are smaller than the one of the full model. The regression that considers habit is 
not significant and therefore cannot be interpreted.  
Immediate benefits were tested using an ANOVA test, the details of which are presented in 
the Appendix L.1. There is a significant difference between the means of categories three and 
one. The means of perceived risks differ by 1.5983. This means that respondents who download 
the app if the benefits are available on the long term perceive less risk on average. 
H1a, H1b and H1c 
The moderation analysis effectuated on the relation between perceived risks and adoption 
did not indicate that transparency, control, or bandwagon had to be considered. The details of 
this analysis are available in Appendix P. Because of this result, regressions were run to see if 
the three variables could be considered as independent variables regarding adoption. This is the 
case for bandwagon and control. For the regression with bandwagon as X and adoption as Y, 
the R-squared is of 0.0657, which means that 6.57% of the variation in adoption can be 
explained by the bandwagon effect. Furthermore, if bandwagon increases by one unit, the 
adoption increases by 0.41605. For the regression with control as X and adoption as Y, the R-
squared is of 0.0507, which means that 5.07% of the variation in adoption can be explained by 
the control user has over the personal data on the app. Furthermore, if control increases by one 









Chapter 5: Discussion 
The average adoption of Coronalert is very close to neutral, meaning that respondents do not 
really have an opinion on whether they should download the app or not. The reason behind 
those figures could be that the app is already outdated: it was launched in September 2020 and 
the questionnaire only in July 2021. By July, the pandemic was already slowing down, and 
“normal” life was starting to feel easier to reach. This could be why the adoption is fairly 
neutral. The average adoption of CovidsafeBE ranges from “agree” to “somewhat agree”, 
meaning that, in general, respondents were ready to adopt the app. The app was launched at the 
end of June 2021, which means it is a very current topic. More and more people are getting 
vaccinated in Belgium. In addition, since the certificate is required to travel and July and August 
are the two vacation months in Belgium, people want to download the app so they can travel 
easily.  
 
Furthermore, the average perceived benefits of Coronalert are close to the trend of 
agreement, meaning that respondents more or less agree that downloading the Coronalert app 
will allow them to be notified if they have been in contact with someone who tested positive 
for Covid-19. Perceived risks, on the other hand, are again very close to neutral. This means 
that respondents do not really know if their personal data is safe on the Coronalert app or not. 
For CovidsafeBE, the average of perceived benefits indicates that respondents agree with the 
benefits it gives, in other words respondents agree that downloading the app will make their 
travel easier. On the other hand, the perceived risks are very close to neutral, meaning that 
respondents are not sure whether their data is safe on the app or not. 
 
The multiple regressions and ANOVA tests performed showed the influence of the different 
independent variables on the dependent variables. For Coronalert, hypotheses 1, 2, 3c, 4c, and 
6d were validated. These hypotheses, respectively, state that the perceived benefits have a 
positive influence on Coronalert adoption, the perceived risks have a negative influence on 
Coronalert adoption, the trust in government and immediate benefits have a negative influence 
on perceived risk, and the trust in government and immediate benefits have a positive influence 
on perceived benefits. For CovidsafeBE, hypotheses 1, 2, 3c, 4c, and 6e were validated. These 
hypotheses respectively state that perceived benefits have a positive influence on CovidsafeBE 
adoption, that perceived risks have a negative influence on CovidsafeBE adoption, that trust in 




of using apps have a positive influence on perceived benefits. In both cases the hypotheses 3a, 
3b, 4a, 4b, 5e, and 5d were rejected. They stipulate, respectively, that knowledge about data 
treatment and data breach experience positively influences the perceived risks of the app, that 
knowledge about data treatment and data breach experience negatively influences perceived 
benefits, and that perception of technology as a habit and immediate benefits negatively 
influences the perceived risks.  
 
The adoption of Coronalert is mostly influenced by the perceived risks related to data 
privacy on the application. The data collected on the app is highly sensitive and such a large 
amount of it has never been requested by the government before (Fey and Hino, 2020). 
Therefore, it makes sense that people are more influenced by the possible risks regarding the 
use of the application. Furthermore, for the app to be effective in slowing the spread of 
coronavirus, several conditions must be met: enough people must download and use it, users 
must always have their phones with them, and the Covid-19 test results must be highly accurate 
(Rowe, 2020).  
 
Then, the adoption of CovidsafeBE is mostly impacted by the perceived benefits of using 
the app: having a Covid-19 certificate on hand at all times. Data privacy risks also impact 
adoption, but this impact is less considerable, which may be explained by the fact that the 
certificate is available through two other channels, one of which is the ability to go to eHealth 
and print the certificate (CovidSafeBE, n.d.). This way, the data needed to create the certificate 
is not just created for the application. 
 
Trust in government has the greatest impact on perceived benefits and risks for both apps. 
This means that if respondents trust the government, their perceived benefits of using the app 
increase. The impact on perceived risks is negative because if the trust increases, the perceived 
risks decrease. Therefore, the hypotheses are confirmed and the government, i.e., the issuing 
authority of the app, influences the perceived benefits and risks of the users. A similar effect is 
observed in apps issued by other brands or organizations (Sundar et al., 2020). 
 
Past experiences with data theft did not have a significant result in the multiple regressions 
run on the perceived benefits and perceived risks of the two applications. This could be because 




not occur on a government website or app, it may be less likely to influence the user to apply a 
more privacy protective behavior upon government-issued platforms. Previous research has 
often compared the data breach experience and the effect of behavior change within the 
organization where the breach occurred (Lulandala, 2020).  In addition, studies have shown that 
45% of the users who experienced a data breach did not change their online behavior or have 
an opinion on whether they changed their behavior or not (Johnson, 2021). This could explain 
why there is no significant impact on the perceived benefits and perceived risks.  
 
The perception of applications as a habit has no influence on the perceived benefits and 
risks of Coronalert. The reason behind this result could be explained by the fact that Coronalert 
was not widely downloaded in Belgium. Thus, respondents did not consider this application as 
a habit (Lefevre, 2021).  Therefore, it has no impact on perceived benefits or risks. By looking 
at CovidsafeBE, there is a significant impact of the perception of applications as a habit on the 
perceived benefits of the application. The application is made to ease the lives of the users by 
offering the possibility to always have a Covid-19 certificate with them, no printing needed 
(CovidSafeBE, n.d.). In this case, technology replaces printing, so it makes sense that it would 
have an impact on perceived benefits. However, perceived risks are not affected by the fact that 
apps become a habit, so we cannot conclude that users are less or more concerned about privacy 
risks in this case. This could be explained by the fact that the habit of using apps in general was 
analyzed instead of the habit of using government apps. However, this analysis would have 
been difficult because there are not many government applications that were used as often as 
Facebook for example. (MYBELGIUM, n.d.; Lulandala, 2020).  
 
Knowledge does not have a significant impact on the perceived benefits and perceived risks 
of either application. An explanation for this is that respondents are on average close to neutral 
in terms of their knowledge of data processing. If they are mostly neutral, no effect can be 
measured on the perceived risks and perceived benefits. Removing the neutral option could 
have resulted in more extreme options, tending more toward agreeing or disagreeing (Nowlis 
et al., 2002). 
 
The effect of immediate benefits on perceived benefits was tested using ANOVA. 
Differences in means that are significant between different categories should be interpreted in 




Coronalert, the app was presented as a way to stop the spread of Covid-19, but because the app 
was not mandatory, few people downloaded it and only 2.7% of Covid-19 positive tests are 
reported on the app (Lefevre, 2021). This means that the conditions of enough people 
downloading the app, the need for users to have their phones with them at all times, and high 
accuracy regarding who tests positive and who does not (Rowe, 2020) are not met. Therefore, 
the benefits of downloading Coronalert are not available in the short term. Thus, the difference 
in means of perceived benefits for respondents who are sensitive to the immediacy of the 
benefits and respondents who would download the app even if the benefits are only available 
in the long term is significant. Those in the former category have a more neutral view of 
perceived benefits so the formulation of the hypothesis “immediate benefits positively influence 
the perceived benefits of using Coronalert” cannot be confirmed, however, since there are no 
immediate benefits, the hypothesis is possible if it is differently formulated: “Not having 
immediate benefits negatively influences the perceived benefits of using Coronalert”. In the 
case of CovidsafeBE the immediate benefits are noticeable because the app allows a user to 
permanently have their certificate at hand once they obtained it by being fully vaccinated, 
having a negative covid-19 test or having a proof that they recovered from Covid-19 
(CovidSafeBE, n.d.). Therefore, the difference in means of perceived benefits between people 
who are sensitive to the immediacy of the benefits and respondents who would never download 
the app is significant. However, the difference between the former category and respondents 
who would download the app even if the benefits are only available in the long term is not 
significant, therefore the hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The reason for this could be that the 
question was not clearly enough formulated and that respondents did not understand the 
hypothetical situation presented to them, which was that people would travel freely in X days/ 
weeks/ months after downloading the application. Another possible explanation is that the 
difference between people who would ‘always’ download the application and people who 
would only download it if the benefits were available on the short term is not significant because 
the sample is not representative enough, only 7 people belong to the former category and 104 
in the latter.  
 
Regarding the influence of immediate benefits on perceived risks there is no significant 
difference in the categories of interest. The reason why the hypothesis “immediate benefits 
negatively influence the perceived risks of using government health technology services” 




questionnaire were only related to data privacy. Furthermore, as was explained earlier, the 
immediacy of the benefits of Coronalert is not very clear at this point.  
 
The moderation analysis conducted by using Hayes macro did not identify one of the three 
moderators as significant for the Coronalert or the CovidsafeBE application. However, when 
a regression is run, control and transparency are significant for Coronalert adoption and control 
and bandwagon for CovidsafeBE adoption. The reason why bandwagon was not considered as 
a moderator could be because the applications do not show who downloaded the app as is the 
case for social media platforms (Fu et al., 2012).  The reason why control and transparency are 
not considered as moderators could be because the respondents are not enough aware or do not 
possess enough knowledge to accord importance to transparency or control (Lee & Calugar-
Pop, 2020).  
 
The different hypotheses that were validated for Coronalert are not enough to define if the 
privacy paradox is applied to this particular health technology service. The different theories 
that were tested are not conclusive, thus there is no clear sign that users do not apply a privacy 
protective behavior even if they intend to do so.  
 
The hypotheses that were validated in the case of CovidsafeBE could imply that the privacy 
paradox is present, however, since the application was only launched at the end of June 2021 
and the research was conducted a few weeks later it could be possible that only early adopters 
and innovators downloaded adopted the application (Meade & Rabelo, 2004). Between the 16th 
of June and the 2nd of August 11 million certificates were issued in Belgium and half of them 
were obtained by citizens through the application (Belga, 2021). Therefore, it could be that part 
of the early majority still had to adopt the application after the 22nd of July, the date the 







Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The purpose of our research was to analyze how the privacy paradox applied to the adoption 
of health technology services.  
 
In order to be able to complete this thesis, a literature search was conducted where users' 
privacy concerns, the privacy paradox, and the different theories surrounding it were discussed. 
Then, the conceptual model was created with the corresponding hypotheses. To verify this 
conceptual model, the case studies of Coronalert and CovidsafeBE were applied to a 
questionnaire that was distributed on social media. The results of this questionnaire were used 
to test the different hypotheses. A summary of these results will be discussed below, after that 
some managerial and theoretical implications will be issued.  
 
First, we weren’t able to analyze the adoption of Coronalert because the average of the 
respondents did not know if they would adopt it or not. Therefore, it was difficult to analyze 
whether the privacy paradox applied to this application. However, we were able to identify a 
significant impact of perceived risks and perceived benefits on the adoption of the app. We also 
concluded that trust in government had an impact on both perceived risks and perceived 
benefits, indicating that this heuristic would influence respondents' decision making. In 
addition, immediate benefits could also influence decision making as they have a significant 
outcome. Respondents who would download the app even if the benefits were available in the 
long term perceived more benefits than those who would only download it if the benefits were 
available in the short term or those who would never download it. Furthermore, respondents 
who download the app even if the benefits are available in the long run perceived less risks than 
those who would never download the app. This indicates that people who focus on the potential 
benefits may be making a biased decision. By analyzing the regression of perceived risks and 
benefits on app adoption, we can see that respondents consider risks to be more important than 
benefits. Therefore, it appears that citizens tried to make a rational decision by weighing the 
benefits and risks of the app, but because the app did not meet the requirements to work, the 
expected benefits of slowing the pandemic are not available. requirements were: enough people 
have to download the app; users should always have their phones with them; high required 
accuracy for who tests positive and who does not (Rowe, 2020). This may help explain why the 




for a benefit that does not exist. Even though the government assures that no personal 
information is kept (Coronalert, n.d.). 
 
Secondly, we found that CovidsafeBE was more likely to help answer our research question, 
which is how the privacy paradox applies to the adoption of health technology services. Because 
the average adoption in our research shows that the application is adopted, furthermore a recent 
article showed that between June 16th and August 2nd, 11 million certificates were issued in 
Belgium and half of them were obtained by citizens through the application (Belga, 2021) 
which supports our deduction. The average in perceived benefits of the application is also more 
or less high, meaning that respondents consider the app as a tool for easy travel. Furthermore, 
the habit of using applications influences the perceived benefits, indicating that habit increases 
the perceived benefits and thus may cause the user to overweigh benefits when evaluating the 
benefits and risks to make a decision. Additionally, again, trust influenced perceived benefits 
and risks, which indicates that this heuristic influences the decision-making process of the 
respondents. In summary, at least two variables were found to influence users' decision making, 
indicating that users are partially influenced by the privacy paradox. Even more so when 
considering that the application is not the only way to obtain a Covid-19 certificate, it is also 
available through eHealth and by calling a helpdesk to obtain the certificate by mail 
(CovidSafeBE, n.d.) as the risks of sharing data through an app could be avoided by using the 
other two channels. 
1 Managerial implications 
This section will indicate the managerial implications to elaborate on the conclusion written 
in the previous section. We analyzed the privacy paradox in the context of health technology 
services. The results of the study have the potential of helping the government for adoption of 
different platforms related to health services.  
 
First, since trust impacts the perceived benefits and risks of both apps, it is important for the 
government to place a lot of emphasis on the trust of its citizens in order to increase the adoption 
of the apps it issues. With respect to the Coronalert app launched to slow the spread of the 
Covid-19 virus, the government has not done enough work on citizen trust. Trust in the 
government could be increased by more explanation or by making a campaign to explain how 




Therefore, by increasing communication, trust could increase and, as a result, the perceived 
benefits and perceived risks would also decrease. 
 
Second, by looking at the point of view of the users. They weigh benefits and risks to make 
decisions however they do not possess all the information to make their decision. In the case of 
Coronalert they do not consider the benefits because there are none, however if more people 
downloaded and used the application it could work. Therefore, it is important that they inform 
themselves to increase their knowledge of the possible benefits.  
2 Theoretical implications 
This section will indicate the theoretical implications of our research based on the different 
results. These implications may be of interest to researchers, as the relationships highlighted 
can lead to further research directions. 
 
The privacy paradox, which states that even if users don't trust social networks and the 
internet, they still use them, is applied to health technology services. We observed that people 
agree to use the CovidsafeBE application even though other channels than an application are 
available. Furthermore, even though respondents try to make a rational decision by considering 
risks and benefits, the benefits have a very high impact on the adoption of CovidsafeBE. These 
benefits are influenced by trust in the government and the habit of using applications. Therefore, 
the privacy paradox analyzed in this sector should be further analyzed in all fields of e-
government.    
 
From another perspective, this research was applied to two very specific case studies. Indeed, 
Coronalert and CovidsafeBE are two applications issued by the Belgian government in the 
context of the Covid-19 pandemic that started in 2020 and is still ongoing at the time of writing 
this research paper. Therefore, the analysis of the different variables that influenced the 
adoption of these applications can be used in future research to understand what influences 
users in times of crisis. In addition, this thesis can also be used by researchers studying the 
impact of the pandemic on technology adoption in general, as it provides the perspective of the 




3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This section will highlight the limitations of this research and offer some suggestions for 
future research. 
 
The first limitation of this research is the choice of variables and questions used in our 
questionnaire. In addition, the average time respondents took to complete the questionnaire was 
12 minutes, which is too long. We decided not to take into account all the theories identified to 
analyze the privacy paradox, the prospect theory was not used, and some theories were not fully 
analyzed such as cognitive heuristics, only 4 of the twelve heuristics identified by Sundar et al. 
(2020) were used; and underinsurance theory, past experiences and knowledge were analyzed 
but we did not estimate how users intended to protect their personal data (Kunreuther, 1984). 
Furthermore, the past experiences of data theft that were considered were in general and not 
analyzed specifically for applications issued by the government. However, in Belgium not a lot 
of applications of the government are integrated, thus analyzing this is more difficult. 
Furthermore, we only analyzed perceived privacy risks because we wanted to focus on privacy 
concerns. Moreover, some questions could have been asked differently. For example, some 
respondents had difficulty understanding the question about immediate benefits. Particularly, 
for Coronalert, some respondents did not believe in the hypothetical situation “the pandemic 
would slow down in X days/weeks/months if the app is downloaded”, and therefore did not 
consider the hypothetical situation.  
 
The second limitation is the size of our sample. Indeed, our total sample is composed of 135 
people, 128 were considered for Coronalert and 122 for CovidsafeBE. It would have been better 
to obtain more observations to increase the representativeness of our sample. In addition, we 
analyzed how the privacy paradox applied to the adoption of health technology services for 
apps that were launched only in Belgium. Furthermore, we analyzed an app that was not 
adopted by Belgian citizens. Nevertheless, it was interesting to analyze how and why this app 
was not adopted. 
 
The third limitation is that the chosen case studies are very new and not fully integrated by 
the citizens at the time of the questionnaire. Though this research allowed for a view on recent 
applications that were issued in the context of a crisis such as a pandemic. A generalization of 





Finally, propositions for further research are to repeat a survey with a larger sample and to 
include all the identified theories of the privacy paradox into the research model such as the 
prospect theory and a more thorough application of the under-insurance theory. In addition, 
other platforms should be considered to analyze how the privacy paradox applies to the adoption 
of health technology services such as e-health. More so, e-government-issued platforms from 
other countries should also be considered, this would allow to analyze the impact of different 
political climates and mentalities. These proposals would allow for a more in-depth analysis of 
whether and how the privacy paradox influences users' decisions regarding government-issued 
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Appendix  A: Questionnaire 
Presentation 
Hello, my name is Soazic Delefortrie and I am Master's student in management engineering 
at the University of Namur. As part of my thesis, I am conducting a study on the adoption of 
applications launched by the government during the Covid-19 pandemic. It would be helpful 
and appreciated if you could answer the following questions. It will take approximately 12 
minutes. 
Your answers will remain anonymous and will only be used for the purposes of my thesis. 
Thank you in advance for your time and participation. 
 
Filter questions 
1) As the survey targets applications launched in Belgium, only people who live in Belgium 
are invited to respond. 
 I live in Belgium 
 I do not live in Belgium -> end of questionnaire 
  
2) As the survey targets applications launched in Belgium, only people who live in Belgium 
and who own a smartphone are invited to respond. 
 I have a smartphone 
 I don't have a smartphone -> end of questionnaire 
 
General behavior 
In order to understand your behavior in relation to the following themes, please answer the 
next questions. 








4) When thinking about data processing, how do you position yourself in relation to the 




5) Have you ever experienced data theft?  
 Yes 
 No 
  I don't know 
 
6) When thinking about downloading new applications, answer the questions below. 
 
 








The Coronalert app was launched around September 2020 and was introduced by the 
government to slow down the spread of Covid-19. The app sends a notification to the user when 
that person has been in contact with another who has tested positive for Covid-19. 
 
8) Since this study analyses the adoption of applications launched by the government during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, it is important to know if you have heard of these applications. 
  I have already heard of Coronalert  
  I have never heard of Coronalert 
 
9) What if we could stop the spread of the pandemic by sharing some data? Choose between 
sharing the data by downloading the Coronalert application and stopping the pandemic in ... 







10) Thinking about the Coronalert application, how do you position yourself in relation to 




11) Thinking about the Coronalert application, how do you position yourself in relation to 
the following questions?  
 
 
12) Thinking about the Coronalert application, how do you position yourself in relation to 




13) Thinking about the Coronalert application, how do you position yourself in relation to 






14) Thinking about the Coronalert application, how do you position yourself in relation to 





The CovidsafeBE application was launched in mid-June and was introduced by the 
government to carry a Covid certificate with you at all times. A Covid certificate can be 
obtained by being vaccinated, having a negative PCR test or having proof of recovery from 
Covid-19. The purpose of the certificate is to allow free travel in Europe again. 
 
15) Since this study analyses the adoption of applications launched by the government during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, it is important to know if you have heard of these applications. 
  I have already heard of CovidsafeBE  
  I have never heard of CovidsafeBE 
 
16) What if people could travel freely again by downloading CovidsafeBE? Choose between 
sharing data by downloading the CovidsafeBE app and travelling freely in ... time or not 










18) Thinking about the CovidsfeBE application, how do you relate to the following question 
 
19) Thinking about the CovidsfeBE application, how do you relate to the following 
questions? 
 














23) What age category do you fall into? 
  12 years or less       
  13 - 18 years  
  19 - 24 years 
  25 - 30 years 
  31 - 40 years 
  41- 50 years 
  51 - 60 years 
  61 - 70 years 
  71 years or older 
 
24) What is your gender? 
  Female  






25) What is your highest level of education? 
  Elementary School  
  Lower secondary  
  Higher secondary  
  Bachelor's degree  




26) What is your occupation? 
  Student 
  Civil servant 
  Retired 
  Self-employed  
  Currently unemployed  
  Manager 
  Labourer 




Thank you for your participation in this survey! 
 
Appendix  B: Measurement scales 
 




  Items Scale Source 
Adoption Original Intention to use 
1. Assuming I have access to the system, I intend to download it. 
2. Given that I have access to the system, I predict that I would download it.  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
(Gao et al., 2011) 
Adaptation 1. Assuming I have access to the Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE application, I intend to download it.  
2. Given that I have access to the Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE application, I predict that I would download it.  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 
Perceived risks Original Privacy risk  
1. What are the chances that using an XXX will cause you to lose control over privacy of your payment 
information?  
2. My signing up for and using an XXX would lead to a loss of privacy for me because my personal 
information would be used without my knowledge.  
3. Internet hackers (criminals) might take control of my checking account if I used XXX.  
7-point Likert, improbable/ 





Adaptation Privacy risk  
1. What are the chances that using the Coronalert/CovidsafeBE application will cause you to lose control 
over privacy of your location/medical records?  
2. My downloading and using of the Coronalert/CovidsafeBE application would lead to a loss of privacy 
for me because my personal information would be used without my knowledge  
3. Internet hackers (criminals) might steal my private information if I used the Coronalert/CovidsafeBE 
application   
7-point Likert, highly 
improbable/ probable 
 
Perceived benefits Original Shopping Convenience  
1. Can shop in privacy of home 
2. I don’t have to leave home 
3. Can shop whenever I want 
4.Can save the effort of visiting stores  
Ease/Comfort of Shopping 
1. Don’t have to wait to be served  
2. No hassles 
3. Not embarrassed if you don’t buy  
4. No busy signal  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 




1. I will be informed if I have been in contact with a person who has tested positive for Covid-19 
2. I will help to track the spread of the Covid-19 virus 
3. On the long term I will help to stop the spread of the Covid-19 virus 
4. Always be notified in case of possible infection 
Covidsafe 
1. I have my certificate available on my phone 






2. I can use the application to travel easily 
3. I will always have my certificate at hand 
4. I don't have to worry about forgetting my certificate in case I need it 
Bandwagon Original 1. How likely is it that you would purchase/use products worn by most people?  
2. How likely is it that you would purchase/use popular products that everyone would approve of?  
3. How likely is it that you would purchase/use products recognized by many people?  




Adaptation 1. How likely is it that you would download applications used by most people?  
2. How likely is it that you would download applications that everyone would approve of? 
3. How likely is it that you would download applications recognized by many people?  
7-point Likert, very likely/ 
unlikely 
 
Control Original Perceived Control  
1. I believe I have control over who can get access to my personal information collected by this online 
banking service. 
2. I think I have control over what personal information is released by this online banking service.  
3. I believe I have control over how personal information is used by this online banking service.  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
(Chang et al., 
2015) 
 
Adaptation Perceived Control  
1. I believe I have control over who can get access to my personal information collected by Coronalert/ 
CovidsafeBE 
2. I think I have control over what personal information is released by the Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE 
application 
3. I believe I have control over how personal information is used by the Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE 
application 
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 
Transparency Original Perceived information transparency (PIT)  
1. The ERP allows me to track my activities  
2. The ERP provides information on the organization rules and regulations  
3. The ERP provides information about the organization decisions and actions  
4. The ERP promotes monitoring of the organization financial expenditures  
5. The ERP disseminates information on the organization performance  
6. The ERP promotes openness of the organization processes, like hiring & promotion  
7. Overall, the ERP system has enhanced transparency in my organization 





Adaptation Perceived information transparency  
1. The Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE application allows me to track my activities  
2. Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE provides information on the rules and regulations of the application 
3. Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE provides information about the decisions and actions of the application 
4. Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE disseminates information on the performance of the application 
5. Overall, Coronalert/ CovidsafeBE is a transparent application regarding data treatment and performance  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 
Knowledge Original Factor 1. Technology Operations and concepts 
1. I can explain how technological devices operate. 
2. I can use technological devices in different ways. 








3. I can define the technological devices found in our facility. 
4. I can do basic things regarding computer technologies. 
5. I can explain general concepts related to computer technology. 
6. I can use technological devices effectively.  
Adaptation Data treatment and concepts 
1. I can explain how data treatment on applications operate. 
2. I can use data treatment in different ways. 
3. I can define data treatment used on applications. 
4. I can do basic things regarding data treatment. 
5. I can explain general concepts related to data treatment. 
6. I can use data treatment effectively.  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 
Trust Original 1. I trust __________. 
2. __________ makes truthful claims. 
3. __________ is honest. 
4. I do not believe what __________ tells me.  





Adaptation 1. I trust my government. 
2. The Belgian government makes truthful claims. 
3. The Belgian government is honest. 
4. I do not believe what the Belgian government tells me.  
7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
 
Immediate benefits Original Titration, environmental loss 
What if the improved air quality were to start one year from now? 
1. - Receive $20 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
2. - Receive $50 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
3. - Receive $130 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
4. - Receive $325 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
5. - Receive $800 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
6. - Receive $2100 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
7. - Receive $5200 immediately  - permanently improved air quality starting one year from now 
Choose between 2 options (Hardisty et al., 
2011) 
 
Adaptation Coronalert:  
1. Stopping the pandemic in two years and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
2. Stopping the pandemic in one year and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
3. Stopping the pandemic in six months and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
4. Stopping the pandemic in three months and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
5. Stopping the pandemic in one month and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
6. Stopping the pandemic in one week and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
7. Stopping the pandemic in one day and download Coronalert or not download Coronalert 
CovidsafeBE: 
1. Travelling freely in six months and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 




2. Travelling freely in three months and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
3. Travelling freely in one month and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
4. Travelling freely in two weeks and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
5. Travelling freely in one week and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
6. Travelling freely in one day and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
7. Travel freely immediately and download CovidsafeBE or not download CovidsafeBE 
Habit Original [Behavior X] is something… ->  
1. I do frequently. 
2. I do automatically. 
3. I do without having to consciously remember. 
4. That makes me feel weird if I do not do it. 
5. I do without thinking. 
6. That would require effort not to do it. 
7. That belongs to my (daily, weekly, monthly) routine. 
8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it. 
9. I would find hard not to do  
10. I have no need to think about doing. 
11. that’s typically ‘me’. 
12. I have been doing for a long time. 
5 or 7-point Likert, strongly 
disagree/ agree 
(Rebar et al., 
2018) 
 
Adaptation Using applications is something… -> 
1. I do frequently.  
2. I do automatically.  
3. I do without having to consciously remember. 
4. That makes me feel weird if I do not do it. 
5. I do without thinking. 
6. That would require effort not to do it. 
7. That belongs to my (daily, weekly, monthly) routine. 
8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it.  
9. I would find hard not to do.  
10. I have no need to think about doing. 
11. that’s typically ‘me’.  
12. I have been doing for a long time. 







Appendix  C: Coronalert, Descriptive statistics 
Variable Label N Average Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Z2 Gender 128 0.6171875 0.4879831 0 1.0000000 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 128 36.3046875 17.5852518 15.5000000 80.0000000 
Z5 Student 128 0.4062500 0.4930621 0 1.0000000 
Z6 Employee 128 0.2109375 0.4095772 0 1.0000000 
Z7 Retired 128 0.0703125 0.2566776 0 1.0000000 
Z8 Civil servent 128 0.1328125 0.3407055 0 1.0000000 
Z9 Long-term illness 128 0.0078125 0.0883883 0 1.0000000 
Z10 Self-employed 128 0.0703125 0.2566776 0 1.0000000 
Z11 Manager 128 0.0312500 0.1746763 0 1.0000000 
Z12 Currently unemployed 128 0.0312500 0.1746763 0 1.0000000 
Z13 Disability 128 0.0234375 0.1518829 0 1.0000000 
Z14 Liberal proffesion 128 0.0156250 0.1245069 0 1.0000000 
Z15 Higher secondary 128 0.1718750 0.3787542 0 1.0000000 
Z16 Bachelor 128 0.3203125 0.4684300 0 1.0000000 
Z17 Master 128 0.5000000 0.5019646 0 1.0000000 
Z18 PhD 128 0.0078125 0.0883883 0 1.0000000 
CO Coronalert 128 1.0000000 0 1.0000000 1.0000000 
Appendix  D: Coronalert, Measurement scale analysis 





TR2 TR_true_statement 0.91725 
TR3 TR_honest 0.89596 
TR1 TR_trust 0.88601 
TR4i TR_disbelief 0.70131 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.920948   
TR1 TR2 TR3 TR4i 
0.78501688 0.84134244 0.80274729 0.49184158 
EFA without TR4i: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
TR2 TR_true_statement 0.91879 
TR3 TR_honest 0.89625 
TR1 TR_trust 0.87685 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.416288  
TR1 TR2 TR3 
0.76886393 0.84416774 0.80325668 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 












KN2 KN_use 0.91909 
KN6 KN_ease_use 0.91830 
KN5 KN_concepts 0.90144 
KN3 KN_define 0.89592 
KN1 KN_explain 0.89419 
KN4 KN_basic 0.85953 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 4.841638 
KN1 KN2 KN3 KN4 KN5 KN6 
0.79957720 0.84472497 0.80267498 0.73879171 0.81259780 0.84327152 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 









BW3 BW_recognised 0.87316 
BW2 BW_approved 0.84988 
BW1 BW_used 0.82073 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.158307 
BW1 BW2 BW3 
0.67360186 0.72230259 0.76240216 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 














HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.83746 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.81702 
HB3 HB_remember 0.81118 
HB8 HB_realize 0.81108 
HB9 HB_hard 0.77401 
HB7 HB_routine 0.77397 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.74196 
HB1 HB_often 0.72616 
HB6 HB_effort 0.72359 
HB4 HB_sensation 0.64738 
HB11 HB_typically_me 0.59187 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 7.004349 

























EFA without HB4 and HB11: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
HB5 HB_thinking 0.87483 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.84115 
HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.83161 
HB3 HB_remember 0.81885 
HB8 HB_realize 0.79345 
HB7 HB_routine 0.78528 
HB1 HB_often 0.75756 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.75737 
HB9 HB_hard 0.74654 
HB6 HB_effort 0.68546 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 6.255833 





















EFA without HB6: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
HB5 HB_thinking 0.86125 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.85706 
HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.82641 
HB3 HB_remember 0.81740 
HB7 HB_routine 0.80523 
HB1 HB_often 0.78258 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.77879 
HB8 HB_realize 0.77455 
HB9 HB_hard 0.70487 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 5.791477 



















EFA without HB9: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.87037 
HB5 HB_thinking 0.84931 
HB3 HB_remember 0.81983 
HB7 HB_routine 0.81936 







HB12 HB_long_time 0.78717 
HB8 HB_realize 0.74810 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 5.293222 
























CO_C3 Co_C_used 0.91519 
CO_C2 Co_C_released 0.89881 
CO_C1 Co_C_persons 0.88603 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.430482 
CO_C1 CO_C2 CO_C3 
0.78505634 0.80785706 0.83756820 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 









CO_TRP3 Co_TRP_decisions 0.85546 
CO_TRP2 Co_TRP_info_rules 0.80474 
CO_TRP4 Co_TRP_performance 0.71142 
CO_TRP1 Co_TRP_activities 0.63009 
CO_TRP5 Co_TRP_globally 0.62195 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.669388 
CO_TRP1 CO_TRP2 CO_TRP3 CO_TRP4 CO_TRP5 
0.39701967 0.64760430 0.73181433 0.50612438 0.38682517 
 
EFA without CO_TRP1 and CO_TRP5: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
CO_TRP3 Co_TRP_decisions 0.85407 
CO_TRP2 Co_TRP_info_rules 0.78417 




Final Communality Estimates: Total = 1.787319 
CO_TRP2 CO_TRP3 CO_TRP4 
0.61491679 0.72943553 0.44296686 
 




CO_TRP3 Co_TRP_decisions 0.80134 
CO_TRP2 Co_TRP_info_rules 0.80134 












CO_PB2 Co_PB_spread 0.80920 
CO_PB1 Co_PB_contact 0.76434 
CO_PB4 Co_PB_notified 0.74545 
CO_PB3 Co_PB_long_term 0.73316 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.332239 
CO_PB1 CO_PB2 CO_PB3 CO_PB4 
0.58421046 0.65480639 0.53752144 0.55570071 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 









CO_PR2 Co_PR_loss 0.83016 
CO_PR3 Co_PR_steal 0.73348 
CO_PR1 Co_PR_control 0.73217 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 1.763233 
CO_PR1 CO_PR2 CO_PR3 
0.53607558 0.68916266 0.53799448 
Cronbach’s Alpha : 












CO_AD1 Co_AD_intend 0.98109 
CO_AD2 Co_AD_predict 0.98109 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 1.925056 
CO_AD1 CO_AD2 
0.96252814 0.96252814 
Cronbach’s Alpha : 





Appendix  E: Coronalert Analysis of variance 
Appendix E.1: Immediate benefits   
Perceived benefits 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 2 24.5147720 12.2573860 10.16 <.0001 




Average Std dev 
1 19 3.86842105 1.33948690 
2 9 3.94444444 1.27951271 
3 100 2.83500000 1.03182931 
Tukey  
Alpha 0.05 




Critical value of 
studentized range 3.35446 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
CO_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
2-1 0.0760 -0.9782 1.1302  
2-3 1.1094 0.2028 2.0161 *** 






Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 2 26.0848384 13.0424192 9.52 0.0001 
Error 125 171.2728005 1.3701824   




Average Std dev 
1 19 2.38596491 1.04387193 
2 9 2.96296296 1.04674687 








Critical value of 
studentized range 3.35446 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
CO_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
3-2 0.6570 -0.3092 1.6233  
3-1 1.2340 0.5392 1.9289 *** 
2-1 0.5770 -0.5465 1.7005  
 
Appendix E.2: Gender 
Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 1 0.8137937 0.8137937 0.20 0.6534 
Error 126 506.2408938 4.0177849   
Corrected total 127 507.0546875    
Perceived benefits 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 1 1.1919406 1.1919406 0.86 0.3548 
Error 126 174.1186063 1.3818937   
Corrected total 127 175.3105469    
Perceived risks 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 




Error 126 195.9493671 1.5551537   
Corrected total 127 197.3576389    
Appendix E.3: Age 
Adoption  
Pearson correlation 
Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_AD 
Age 









Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_PB 
Age 








Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 7 23.4516516 3.3502359 2.65 0.0140 
Error 120 151.8588953 1.2654908   




Average Std dev 
0 2 4.50000000 0.70710678 
1 57 2.90789474 1.07698278 
2 16 2.64062500 1.18662248 
3 4 3.62500000 1.01036297 
4 8 3.09375000 0.39949745 
5 27 2.97222222 1.09705316 
6 12 4.12500000 1.61491627 
7 2 3.25000000 1.06066017 
 
Alpha 0.05 




Critical value of 
studentized range 4.36297 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
CO_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
0 - 6 0.3750 -2.2757 3.0257  




0 - 7 1.2500 -2.2205 4.7205  
0 - 4 1.4063 -1.3374 4.1499  
0 - 5 1.5278 -1.0155 4.0711  
0 - 1 1.5921 -0.9046 4.0888  
0 - 2 1.8594 -0.7435 4.4623  
6 - 3 0.5000 -1.5037 2.5037  
6 - 7 0.8750 -1.7757 3.5257  
6 - 4 1.0313 -0.5528 2.6153  
6 - 5 1.1528 -0.0513 2.3569  
6 - 1 1.2171 0.1148 2.3194 *** 
6 - 2 1.4844 0.1590 2.8097 *** 
3 - 7 0.3750 -2.6306 3.3806  
3 - 4 0.5313 -1.5940 2.6565  
3 - 5 0.6528 -1.2066 2.5121  
3 - 1 0.7171 -1.0780 2.5122  
3 - 2 0.9844 -0.9557 2.9245  
7 - 4 0.1563 -2.5874 2.8999  
7 - 5 0.2778 -2.2655 2.8211  
7 - 1 0.3421 -2.1546 2.8388  
7 - 2 0.6094 -1.9935 3.2123  
4 - 5 0.1215 -1.2755 1.5186  
4 - 1 0.1859 -1.1244 1.4962  
4 - 2 0.4531 -1.0497 1.9559  
5 - 1 0.0643 -0.7465 0.8751  
5 - 2 0.3316 -0.7633 1.4265  
1 - 2 0.2673 -0.7146 1.2492  
Perceived risks 
Pearson correlation 
Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_PR 
Age 




Perceived risks of Coronalert 
-0.13023 
1.00000 0.1429 
Appendix E.4: Education 
Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 12.7651573 4.2550524 1.07 0.3655 
Error 124 494.2895302 3.9862059   
Corrected total 127 507.0546875    
Perceived benefits 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 7.0305701 2.3435234 1.73 0.1649 
Error 124 168.2799768 1.3570966   






Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 9.3446854 3.1148951 2.05 0.1097 
Error 124 188.0129535 1.5162335   
Corrected total 127 197.3576389    
 
Appendix E.5: Occupation 
Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 19.5044424 2.1671603 0.52 0.8543 
Error 118 487.5502451 4.1317817   
Corrected total 127 507.0546875    
Perceived benefits 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 16.1070029 1.7896670 1.33 0.2305 
Error 118 159.2035440 1.3491826   
Corrected total 127 175.3105469    
Perceived risks 
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 10.4449804 1.1605534 0.73 0.6782 
Error 118 186.9126585 1.5840056   
Corrected total 127 197.3576389    
 
Appendix  F: Coronalert, Descriptive statistics and 
correlation 
Variable Label Average Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Exp Experience 0.2187500 0.4150230 0 1 
CO_TR Trust 3.6015625 1.3115401 1 7 
CO_HB Habit 2.9980469 1.3912324 1 7 
CO_BW Bandwagon 2.4921875 1.1074905 1 7 
CO_KN Knowledge 4.0312500 1.5777807 1 7 
IB_Cat1 Respondents who would never download Coronalert 0.1484375 0.3569301 0 1 
IB_Cat2 Respondents who would download Coronalert if the benefits were 
noticeable in one month or less 




IB_Cat3 Respondents who would download Coronalert even if benefits are on 
the long term 
0.7812500 0.4150230 0 1 
CO_C Control over Coronalert 4.6328125 1.3726741 1 7 
CO_TRP Transparency regarding Coronalert 3.5429688 1.0518588 1 7 
CO_PR Perceived risks regarding data privacy on Coronalert 3.3906250 1.2465942 1 7 
CO_PB Perceived benefits of Coronalert 3.0664063 1.1749034 1 7 
CO_AD Adoption of the Coronalert application 3.8359375 1.9981383 1 7 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 36.3046875 17.5852518 15.5 80 
Z2 Gender 0.6171875 0.4879831 0 1 
Z5 Student 0.4062500 0.4930621 0 1 
Z6 Employee 0.2109375 0.4095772 0 1 
Z7 Retired 0.0703125 0.2566776 0 1 
Z8 Civil servent 0.1328125 0.3407055 0 1 
Z9 Long-term illness 0.0078125 0.0883883 0 1 
Z10 Self-employed 0.0703125 0.2566776 0 1 
Z11 Manager 0.0312500 0.1746763 0 1 
Z12 Currently unemployed 0.0312500 0.1746763 0 1 
Z14 Liberal proffesion 0.0156250 0.1245069 0 1 
Z15 Higher secondary 0.1718750 0.3787542 0 1 
Z16 Bachelor 0.3203125 0.4684300 0 1 
Z17 Master 0.5000000 0.5019646 0 1 
Z18 PhD 0.0078125 0.0883883 0 1 
 
Appendix  G: Coronalert, Multicollinearity test 

















Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Exp CO_TR CO_HB CO_KN CO_PR CO_PB CO_AD Age Z2 
Exp 
Experience 1.00000 
0.14692 -0.16120 0.02756 -0.05485 0.03860 0.03887 -0.09983 -0.04981 





-0.01625 0.16144 -0.36639 0.40225 0.47713 -0.02792 0.16990 





0.15039 -0.09282 0.15393 0.18701 0.56239 0.00034 
0.0691 0.8555 0.0902 0.2974 0.0828 0.0345 <.0001 0.9970 
CO_KN 
Knowledge 
0.02756 0.16144 0.15039 
1.00000 
-0.20086 0.13745 0.19083 0.17527 0.26452 
0.7575 0.0687 0.0902 0.0230 0.1218 0.0309 0.0478 0.0026 
CO_PR 
Perceived risks regarding data privacy on Coronalert 
-0.05485 -0.36639 -0.09282 -0.20086 
1.00000 
-0.25082 -0.48301 -0.13023 -0.08447 
0.5386 <.0001 0.2974 0.0230 0.0043 <.0001 0.1429 0.3431 
CO_PB 
Perceived benefits of Coronalert 
0.03860 0.40225 0.15393 0.13745 -0.25082 
1.00000 
0.28935 0.18004 0.08246 
0.6653 <.0001 0.0828 0.1218 0.0043 0.0009 0.0420 0.3548 
CO_AD 
Adoption of the Coronalert application 
0.03887 0.47713 0.18701 0.19083 -0.48301 0.28935 
1.00000 
0.03057 0.04006 
0.6631 <.0001 0.0345 0.0309 <.0001 0.0009 0.7320 0.6534 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 
-0.09983 -0.02792 0.56239 0.17527 -0.13023 0.18004 0.03057 
1.00000 
0.03067 
0.2622 0.7544 <.0001 0.0478 0.1429 0.0420 0.7320 0.7311 
Z2 
Gender 
-0.04981 0.16990 0.00034 0.26452 -0.08447 0.08246 0.04006 0.03067 






Intercept 1 5.54122 0.77612 7.14 <.0001 . 0 
CO_PR Perceived risks regarding data privacy on 
Coronalert 
1 -0.71217 0.12859 -5.54 <.0001 0.92569 1.08028 
CO_PB Perceived benefits of Coronalert 1 0.32287 0.13749 2.35 0.0205 0.91157 1.09701 
Age How old are you? (From 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00695 0.00895 -0.78 0.4393 0.95976 1.04193 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.04606 0.31784 -0.14 0.8850 0.98875 1.01137 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 
Number Eigenvalue Condition index Intercept CO_PR CO_PB Age Z2 
1 4.32485 1.00000 0.00202 0.00511 0.00558 0.00837 0.01460 
2 0.33749 3.57978 0.00275 0.02073 0.00769 0.03610 0.92282 
3 0.18228 4.87099 0.00499 0.30934 0.03924 0.39767 0.00003474 
4 0.12670 5.84239 0.00198 0.05038 0.55939 0.45259 0.02184 
5 0.02867 12.28112 0.98826 0.61444 0.38809 0.10527 0.04071 
 
Perceived benefits: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance 
Variable Label DF Parameter estimate Standard error t value Pr > |t| Tolerance   Variance inflation 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.12316 0.40241 2.79 0.0061 . 0 
CO_TR Trust 1 0.35902 0.07527 4.77 <.0001 0.93217 1.07277 
CO_HB Habit 1 0.06372 0.08384 0.76 0.4487 0.66764 1.49781 
CO_KN Knowledge 1 0.02682 0.06440 0.42 0.6778 0.87983 1.13658 
Exp Experience 1 0.01472 0.23623 0.06 0.9504 0.94501 1.05819 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 0.00955 0.00660 1.45 0.1505 0.67392 1.48385 
Z2 Gender 1 0.00165 0.20529 0.01 0.9936 0.90515 1.10479 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 
Number Eigenvalue Condition index Intercept CO_TR CO_HB CO_KN Exp Age Z2 
1 5.47595 1.00000 0.00177 0.00326 0.00340 0.00353 0.00663 0.00367 0.00817 
2 0.78549 2.64034 0.00012442 0.00001283 0.00433 0.00050526 0.86944 0.00343 0.00866 
3 0.35265 3.94053 0.00123 0.00009796 0.04436 0.00011080 0.00002657 0.04543 0.71975 
4 0.16364 5.78481 0.02218 0.24985 0.08183 0.06141 0.11048 0.17315 0.23282 
5 0.10077 7.37153 0.00235 0.28883 0.03249 0.79604 0.00053069 0.00017531 0.02774 
6 0.07874 8.33917 0.00004048 0.02542 0.76599 0.00406 0.00977 0.74963 0.00283 
7 0.04275 11.31728 0.97230 0.43253 0.06759 0.13435 0.00312 0.02451 0.00002541 
 
Perceived risks: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance 
Variable Label DF Parameter estimate Standard error t value Pr > |t| Tolerance   Variance inflation 
Intercept Intercept 1 5.31120 0.43620 12.18 <.0001 . 0 
CO_TR Trust 1 -0.33208 0.08159 -4.07 <.0001 0.93217 1.07277 
CO_HB Habit 1 -0.01910 0.09088 -0.21 0.8339 0.66764 1.49781 
CO_KN Knowledge 1 -0.09857 0.06981 -1.41 0.1605 0.87983 1.13658 
Exp Experience 1 -0.04134 0.25607 -0.16 0.8720 0.94501 1.05819 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00764 0.00716 -1.07 0.2876 0.67392 1.48385 
Z2 Gender 1 0.02687 0.22253 0.12 0.9041 0.90515 1.10479 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 




1 5.47595 1.00000 0.00177 0.00326 0.00340 0.00353 0.00663 0.00367 0.00817 
2 0.78549 2.64034 0.00012442 0.00001283 0.00433 0.00050526 0.86944 0.00343 0.00866 
3 0.35265 3.94053 0.00123 0.00009796 0.04436 0.00011080 0.00002657 0.04543 0.71975 
4 0.16364 5.78481 0.02218 0.24985 0.08183 0.06141 0.11048 0.17315 0.23282 
5 0.10077 7.37153 0.00235 0.28883 0.03249 0.79604 0.00053069 0.00017531 0.02774 
6 0.07874 8.33917 0.00004048 0.02542 0.76599 0.00406 0.00977 0.74963 0.00283 
7 0.04275 11.31728 0.97230 0.43253 0.06759 0.13435 0.00312 0.02451 0.00002541 
 
Appendix  H: Coronalert, regressions 
Appendix H.1: Model 1 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 4 135.49560 33.87390 11.21 <.0001 
Error 123 371.55909 3.02081   
Corrected 
total 127 507.05469    





Coeff Var 45.30956   
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 5.54122 0.77612 7.14 <.0001 0 
CO_PR Perceived risks regarding data 
privacy on Coronalert 
1 -0.71217 0.12859 -5.54 <.0001 -0.44431 
CO_PB Perceived benefits of 
Coronalert 
1 0.32287 0.13749 2.35 0.0205 0.18985 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 
1 -0.00695 0.00895 -0.78 0.4393 -0.06113 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.04606 0.31784 -0.14 0.8850 -0.01125 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 42.83569 14.27856 3.81 0.0118 
Error 124 464.21899 3.74370   
Corrected 
total 127 507.05469    
















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 2.36377 0.58190 4.06 <.0001 0 
CO_PB 
Perceived benefits of 
Coronalert 1 0.49665 0.14902 3.33 0.0011 0.29203 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00256 0.00993 -0.26 0.7970 -0.02252 
Z2 Gender 1 0.06827 0.35309 0.19 0.8470 0.01667 
 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 118.83674 39.61225 12.65 <.0001 





   






Coeff Var 46.12702 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 6.62025 0.63678 10.40 <.0001 0 
CO_PR Perceived risks regarding data 
privacy on Coronalert 
1 -0.78109 0.12745 -6.13 <.0001 -0.48731 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 
1 -0.00374 0.00901 -0.41 0.6789 -0.03289 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.00038213 0.32297 -0.00 0.9991 -0.00009332 
Appendix H.2: Model 2 







square F value Pr > F 
Model 6 35.72426 5.95404 5.16 <.0001 
Error 121 139.58628 1.15361   
Corrected 
total 127 175.31055    






Coeff Var 35.02668 
  
Estimated parameters 












Intercept Intercept 1 1.12316 0.40241 2.79 0.0061 0 
Exp Experience 1 0.01472 0.23623 0.06 0.9504 0.00520 
CO_TR Trust 1 0.35902 0.07527 4.77 <.0001 0.40078 
CO_KN Knowledge 1 0.02682 0.06440 0.42 0.6778 0.03602 
CO_HB Habit 1 0.06372 0.08384 0.76 0.4487 0.07545 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 
1 0.00955 0.00660 1.45 0.1505 0.14298 
Z2 Gender 1 0.00165 0.20529 0.01 0.9936 0.00068381 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 7.36375 2.45458 1.81 0.1484 
Error 124 167.94680 1.35441   
Corrected 
total 127 175.31055    






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 34.79477 11.59826 10.24 <.0001 
Error 124 140.51578 1.13319   
Corrected 
total 127 175.31055    





Coeff Var 34.71539 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.28063 0.34911 3.67 0.0004 0 
CO_TR Trust 1 0.36398 0.07313 4.98 <.0001 0.40631 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.01277 0.00538 2.38 0.0191 0.19115 
Z2 Gender 1 0.01820 0.19656 0.09 0.9264 0.00756 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 8.15643 2.71881 2.02 0.1150 
Error 124 167.15412 1.34802   
Corrected 
total 127 175.31055    
Habit -> Perceived benefits 
Variance analysis 








Model 3 7.46852 2.48951 1.84 0.1435 
Error 124 167.84203 1.35356   
Corrected 
total 127 175.31055    
Appendix H.3: Model 3 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 6 33.34483 5.55747 4.10 0.0009 
Error 121 164.01281 1.35548   
Corrected 
total 127 197.35764    





Coeff Var 34.33732 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 5.31120 0.43620 12.18 <.0001 0 
Exp Experience 1 -0.04134 0.25607 -0.16 0.8720 -0.01376 
CO_TR Trust 1 -0.33208 0.08159 -4.07 <.0001 -0.34938 
CO_KN Knowledge 1 -0.09857 0.06981 -1.41 0.1605 -0.12476 
CO_HB Habit 1 -0.01910 0.09088 -0.21 0.8339 -0.02132 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00764 0.00716 -1.07 0.2876 -0.10783 
Z2 Gender 1 0.02687 0.22253 0.12 0.9041 0.01052 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 5.65140 1.88380 1.22 0.3059 
Error 124 191.70624 1.54602   
Corrected 
total 127 197.35764    
 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 30.45161 10.15054 7.54 0.0001 





total 127 197.35764    















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 5.03609 0.38048 13.24 <.0001 0 
CO_TR Trust 1 -0.34909 0.07970 -4.38 <.0001 -0.36728 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 
1 -0.00992 0.00586 -1.69 0.0930 -0.13994 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.04541 0.21422 -0.21 0.8325 -0.01778 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 10.03058 3.34353 2.21 0.0899 
Error 124 187.32706 1.51070   
Corrected 
total 127 197.35764    






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 4.75324 1.58441 1.02 0.3862 
Error 124 192.60440 1.55326   
Corrected 
total 127 197.35764    
 
Appendix  I: Coronalert, Moderation analysis 
Appendix I.1: Transparency 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 
0.5411 0.2927 2.8921 17.1083 3.0000 124.0000 0.0000 
Model 
 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 4.2295 1.3156 3.2150 0.0017 1.6257 6.8334 
CO_PR -0.5952 0.3815 -1.5602 0.1213 -1.3503 0.1599 
CO_TRP 0.5513 0.3179 1.7345 0.0853 -0.0778 1.1805 
Int_1 -0.0279 0.0965 -0.2893 0.7728 -0.2190 0.1632 
Since there the moderator is not significant, it is interesting to analyze if transparency has a 









square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 57.69849 19.23283 5.31 0.0018 
Error 124 449.35620 3.62384   
Corrected 
total 127 507.05469    















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.58759 0.67472 2.35 0.0202 0 
CO_TRP Transparency regarding 
Coronalert 
1 0.65204 0.16521 3.95 0.0001 0.34325 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 
1 -0.00566 0.00988 -0.57 0.5678 -0.04980 
Z2 Gender 1 0.23270 0.34681 0.67 0.5035 0.05683 
 
Appendix I.2: Control 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 
0.5429 0.2947 2.8839 17.2737 3.0000 124.0000 0.0000 
Model 
 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 3.3708 1.6009 2.1056 0.0373 0.2022 6.5394 
CO_PR -0.4437 0.4118 -1.0775 0.2833 -1.2588 0.3714 
CO_C 0.4800 0.2927 1.6399 0.1036 -0.0993 1.0593 
Int_1 -0.0172 0.0843 -0.2035 0.8391 -0.1841 0.1498 
Since there the moderator is not significant, it is interesting to analyze if control has a direct 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 111.38596 37.12865 11.64 <.0001 
Error 124 395.66873 3.19088   
Corrected 
total 127 507.05469    















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 




CO_C Control over Coronalert 1 0.68648 0.11685 5.88 <.0001 0.47159 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00328 0.00909 -0.36 0.7190 -0.02884 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.00654 0.32622 -0.02 0.9840 -0.00160 
 
Appendix I.3: Bandwagon 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 
0.5161 0.2663 3.0000 15.0054 3.0000 124.0000 0.0000 
Model 
 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 4.5692 1.0852 4.2106 0.0000 2.4214 6.7171 
CO_PR -0.4162 0.3008 -1.3833 0.1691 -1.0116 0.1793 
CO_BW 0.7417 0.3916 1.8943 0.0605 -0.0333 1.5168 
Int_1 -0.1394 0.1098 -1.2700 0.2065 -0.3567 0.0779 
Since there the moderator is not significant, it is interesting to analyze if bandwagon has a 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 18.07487 6.02496 1.53 0.2106 
Error 124 488.97982 3.94339   
Corrected 
total 127 507.05469    
 
 
Appendix  J: CovidsafeBE, Descriptive statistics 
Variable Label N Average Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Z2 Gender 122 0.6147541 0.4886602 0 1.0000000 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 122 37.4754098 17.6064475 15.5000000 80.0000000 
Z5 Student 122 0.3688525 0.4844835 0 1.0000000 
Z6 Employee 122 0.2295082 0.4222507 0 1.0000000 
Z7 Retired 122 0.0737705 0.2624750 0 1.0000000 
Z8 Civil servent 122 0.1393443 0.3477335 0 1.0000000 
Z9 Long-term illness 122 0.0081967 0.0905357 0 1.0000000 
Z10 Self-employed 122 0.0737705 0.2624750 0 1.0000000 
Z11 Manager 122 0.0327869 0.1788127 0 1.0000000 
Z12 Currently unemployed 122 0.0327869 0.1788127 0 1.0000000 
Z13 Disability 122 0.0245902 0.1555111 0 1.0000000 
Z14 Liberal proffesion 122 0.0163934 0.1275067 0 1.0000000 
Z15 Higher secondary 122 0.1803279 0.3860457 0 1.0000000 
Z16 Bachelor 122 0.3196721 0.4682726 0 1.0000000 
Z17 Master 122 0.4918033 0.5019944 0 1.0000000 
Z18 PhD 122 0.0081967 0.0905357 0 1.0000000 





Appendix  K: CovidsafeBE, Measurement scale analysis 





TR2 TR_true_statement 0.91480 
TR3 TR_honest 0.90766 
TR1 TR_trust 0.87755 
TR4i TR_disbelief 0.67178 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.882078 
TR1 TR2 TR3 TR4i 
0.77008576 0.83685061 0.82385526 0.45128649 
EFA without TR4i: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
TR2 TR_true_statement 0.91481 
TR3 TR_honest 0.90587 
TR1 TR_trust 0.87331 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.420158 
TR1 TR2 TR3 
0.76267125 0.83688318 0.82060361 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 










KN6 KN_ease_use 0.92907 
KN2 KN_use 0.91917 
KN5 KN_concepts 0.89551 
KN3 KN_define 0.89520 
KN1 KN_explain 0.89041 
KN4 KN_basic 0.86267 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 4.848393 
KN1 KN2 KN3 KN4 KN5 KN6 















BW3 BW_recognised 0.87620 
BW2 BW_approved 0.85074 
BW1 BW_used 0.83679 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.191711 
BW1 BW2 BW3 
0.70022145 0.72375957 0.76773039 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 









HB5 HB_thinking 0.86128 
HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.81927 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.81387 
HB3 HB_remember 0.79530 
HB8 HB_realize 0.78856 
HB7 HB_routine 0.76867 
HB9 HB_hard 0.76733 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.74468 
HB1 HB_often 0.73361 
HB6 HB_effort 0.70184 
HB4 HB_sensation 0.61958 
HB11 HB_typically_me 0.58848 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 6.824876 

























EFA without HB4, HB6 and HB11: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
HB5 HB_thinking 0.85489 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.85430 
HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.81044 




HB7 HB_routine 0.79898 
HB1 HB_often 0.78667 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.77514 
HB8 HB_realize 0.76073 
HB9 HB_hard 0.68490 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 5.671781 



















EFA without HB9: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
HB2 HB_automatic 0.86563 
HB5 HB_thinking 0.84454 
HB7 HB_routine 0.81209 
HB3 HB_remember 0.80894 
HB1 HB_often 0.80884 
HB10 HB_no_thinking 0.78533 
HB12 HB_long_time 0.78278 
HB8 HB_realize 0.73482 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 5.200110 
HB1 HB2 HB3 HB5 HB7 HB8 HB10 HB12 
0.65422059 0.74931573 0.65437693 0.71325565 0.65949449 0.53996040 0.61674761 0.61273890 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 








BE_C2 BE_C_released 0.93489 
BE_C1 BE_C_persons 0.91040 
BE_C3 BE_C_used 0.90697 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.525444 
BE_C1 BE_C2 BE_C3 
0.82882468 0.87402788 0.82259173 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 












BE_TRP3 BE_TRP_decisions 0.87703 
BE_TRP2 BE_TRP_info_rules 0.83292 
BE_TRP4 BE_TRP_performance 0.81371 
BE_TRP5 BE_TRP_globally 0.63060 
BE_TRP1 BE_TRP_activities 0.48792 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.760788 
BE_TRP1 BE_TRP2 BE_TRP3 BE_TRP4 BE_TRP5 
0.23806975 0.69376064 0.76917838 0.66211813 0.39766132 
EFA without BE_TRP1 and BE_TRP5: 
Factor pattern 
 Factor1 
BE_TRP3 BE_TRP_decisions 0.88975 
BE_TRP2 BE_TRP_info_rules 0.81473 
BE_TRP4 BE_TRP_performance 0.78991 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.079411  
BE_TRP2 BE_TRP3 BE_TRP4 
0.66379033 0.79165594 0.62396439 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 








BE_PB_4 BE_PB_forget 0.79379 
BE_PB_2 BE_PB_travel 0.78717 
BE_PB_3 BE_PB_at_hand 0.77758 
BE_PB_1 BE_PB_certificate 0.76672 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.442231 
BE_PB_1 BE_PB_2 BE_PB_3 BE_PB_4 
0.58786218 0.61963132 0.60463669 0.63010128 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 








BE_PR2 BE_PR_loss 0.88208 
BE_PR1 BE_PR_control 0.84306 
BE_PR3 BE_PR_steal 0.73098 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.023152 




0.71075572 0.77806434 0.53433155 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 








BE_AD2 BE_AD_predict 0.96457 
BE_AD1 BE_AD_intend 0.96457 








Appendix  L: CovidsafeBE, Analysis of variance 
Appendix L.1: Immediate benefits 
Perceived benefits 
ANOVA 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 2 39.1659372 19.5829686 15.44 <.0001 
Error 119 150.9616243 1.2685851   




Average Std dev 
1 11 4.00000000 1.36930639 
2 7 2.28571429 1.39514464 
3 104 2.01682692 1.08176884 
Tukey  
Alpha 0.05 




Critical value of 
studentized range 3.35649 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
BE_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
1-2 1.7143 0.4218 3.0068 *** 








Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 2 30.7582648 15.3791324 8.65 0.0003 
Error 119 211.6864073 1.7788774   




Average Std dev 
1 11 2.57575758 1.49138943 
2 7 3.04761905 1.48359637 








Critical value of 
studentized range 3.35649 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
BE_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
3-2 1.0529 -0.1832 2.2889  
3-1 1.5983 0.5947 2.6020 *** 
2-1 0.5455 -0.9850 2.0760  
 
Appendix L.2: Gender  
Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 1 0.7462440 0.7462440 0.27 0.6052 
Error 120 333.2721986 2.7772683   




Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 1 1.5397955 1.5397955 0.98 0.3242 
Error 120 188.5877660 1.5715647   







Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 1 0.0439629 0.0439629 0.02 0.8830 
Error 120 242.4007092 2.0200059   
Corrected total 121 242.4446721    
 
Appendix L.3: Age  
Adoption  
Pearson correlation 
Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_AD 
Age 









Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_AD 
Age 








Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 7 31.8510511 4.5501502 3.28 0.0033 
Error 114 158.2765104 1.3883904   




Average Std dev 
0 1 1.00000000 . 
1 50 1.94000000 1.07209503 
2 16 2.39062500 1.04868469 
3 5 1.85000000 1.51657509 
4 8 2.50000000 1.21007674 
5 28 2.12500000 1.33420111 
6 12 2.83333333 1.22164817 











Critical value of 
studentized range 4.36705 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
CO_IB Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
7 - 6 2.5417 -0.2373 5.3207  
7 - 4 2.8750 -0.0015 5.7515  
7 - 2 2.9844 0.2555 5.7133 *** 
7 - 5 3.2500 0.5869 5.9131 *** 
7 - 1 3.4350 0.8112 6.0588 *** 
7 - 3 3.5250 0.4808 6.5692 *** 
7 - 0 4.3750 -0.0813 8.8313  
6 - 4 0.3333 -1.3274 1.9941  
6 - 2 0.4427 -0.9468 1.8322  
6 - 5 0.7083 -0.5471 1.9638  
6 - 1 0.8933 -0.2763 2.0630  
6 - 3 0.9833 -0.9534 2.9201  
6 - 0 1.8333 -1.9538 5.6205  
4 - 2 0.1094 -1.4662 1.6849  
4 - 5 0.3750 -1.0837 1.8337  
4 - 1 0.5600 -0.8255 1.9455  
4 - 3 0.6500 -1.4243 2.7243  
4 - 0 1.5000 -2.3593 5.3593  
2 - 5 0.2656 -0.8747 1.4059  
2 - 1 0.4506 -0.5945 1.4957  
2 - 3 0.5406 -1.3236 2.4048  
2 - 0 1.3906 -2.3599 5.1412  
5 - 1 0.1850 -0.6738 1.0438  
5 - 3 0.2750 -1.4915 2.0415  
5 - 0 1.1250 -2.5780 4.8280  
1 - 3 0.0900 -1.6166 1.7966  
1 - 0 0.9400 -2.7348 4.6148  




Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 128 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Age CO_AD 
Age 








Appendix L.4: Education  
Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 33.8365370 11.2788457 4.43 0.0054 
Error 118 300.1819056 2.5439145   







Average Std dev 
0 22 2.02272727 1.05195139 
1 39 2.78205128 1.97948316 
2 60 2.14166667 1.47318307 








Critical value of 
studentized range 3.68547 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
Z3 Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
3 - 1 4.2179 0.0085 8.4274 *** 
3 - 2 4.8583 0.6673 9.0493 *** 
3 - 0 4.9773 0.7273 9.2272 *** 
1 - 2 0.6404 -0.2146 1.4953  




Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 9.8932739 3.2977580 2.16 0.0965 
Error 118 180.2342876 1.5274092   




Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 13.0613073 4.3537691 2.59 0.0562 
Error 118 198.4696581 1.6819463   
Corrected total 121 211.5309654    
 
Appendix L.5: Occupation 
 Adoption  
Anova 
Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 38.6924039 4.2991560 1.63 0.1150 
Error 112 295.3260387 2.6368396   







Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 43.2527482 4.8058609 3.66 0.0005 
Error 112 146.8748133 1.3113823   




Average Std dev 
0 45 1.98333333 1.10833618 
1 28 1.89285714 1.01477185 
2 9 3.55555556 1.63830027 
3 17 1.85294118 0.77590080 
4 1 1.00000000 . 
5 9 2.66666667 1.14564392 
6 4 2.50000000 1.41421356 
7 4 4.00000000 2.16024690 
8 3 3.16666667 1.28290036 








Critical value of 
studentized range 4.56569 
Significant comparisons at the 0.05 level indicated by ***. 
Z4 Comparison Difference/between/average Simultaneous 95% - Confidence interval  
7 - 2 0.4444 -1.7772 2.6661  
7 - 8 0.8333 -1.9903 3.6570  
7 - 5 1.3333 -0.8883 3.5550  
7 - 6 1.5000 -1.1142 4.1142  
7 - 0 2.0167 0.0877 3.9456 *** 
7 - 1 2.1071 0.1310 4.0833 *** 
7 - 3 2.1471 0.0925 4.2016 *** 
7 - 9 2.2500 -0.9517 5.4517  
7 - 4 3.0000 -1.1334 7.1334  
2 - 8 0.3889 -2.0758 2.8536  
2 - 5 0.8889 -0.8539 2.6317  
2 - 6 1.0556 -1.1661 3.2772  
2 - 0 1.5722 0.2222 2.9222 *** 
2 - 1 1.6627 0.2461 3.0793 *** 
2 - 3 1.7026 0.1786 3.2267 *** 
2 - 4 2.5556 -1.3415 6.4526  
8 - 5 0.5000 -1.9647 2.9647  
8 - 6 0.6667 -2.1570 3.4903  
8 - 0 1.1833 -1.0212 3.3878  
8 - 1 1.2738 -0.9721 3.5197  
8 - 3 1.3137 -1.0015 3.6289  
8 - 9 1.4167 -1.9583 4.7916  
8 - 4 2.1667 -2.1023 6.4357  
5 - 6 0.1667 -2.0550 2.3883  




5 - 1 0.7738 -0.6428 2.1904  
5 - 3 0.8137 -0.7103 2.3378  
5 - 9 0.9167 -1.9735 3.8068  
5 - 4 1.6667 -2.2304 5.5637  
6 - 0 0.5167 -1.4123 2.4456  
6 - 1 0.6071 -1.3690 2.5833  
6 - 3 0.6471 -1.4075 2.7016  
6 - 9 0.7500 -2.4517 3.9517  
6 - 4 1.5000 -2.6334 5.6334  
0 - 1 0.0905 -0.7994 0.9804  
0 - 3 0.1304 -0.9221 1.1829  
0 - 9 0.2333 -2.4383 2.9050  
0 - 4 0.9833 -2.7546 4.7212  
1 - 3 0.0399 -1.0968 1.1767  
1 - 9 0.1429 -2.5631 2.8488  
1 - 4 0.8929 -2.8696 4.6554  
3 - 9 0.1029 -2.6608 2.8667  
3 - 4 0.8529 -2.9513 4.6572  




Source DF Sum of squares Medium square F value Pr > F 
Model 9 28.0272001 3.1141333 1.63 0.1160 
Error 112 214.4174720 1.9144417   
Corrected total 121 242.4446721    
 
Appendix  M: CovidsafeBE, Descriptive statistics and 
correlation 
Variabl





Exp Experience 0.2131148 0.4111968 0 1 
BE_TR Trust 3.5546448 1.2666599 1 7 
BE_HB Habit 3.0276639 1.3860387 1 7 
BE_BW Bandwagon 2.5300546 1.1263226 1 7 
BE_KN Knowledge 3.9972678 1.5856310 1 7 
IB_Cat1 Respondents who would never download 
CovidsafeBE 0.0901639 0.2875976 0 1 
IB_Cat2 Respondents who would download CovidsafeBE if the 
benefits were noticeable in one month or less 0.0573770 0.2335207 0 1 
IB_Cat3 Respondents who would download CovidsafeBE even 
if benefits are on the long term 0.8524590 0.3561068 0 1 
BE_C Control over CovidsafeBE 4.3360656 1.3205280 1 7 
BE_TR
P Transparancy over CovidsafeBE 3.6939891 1.0405817 1 7 
BE_PR 
Perceived risks regarding data privacy on 
CovidsafeBE 3.7677596 1.3221913 1 7 
BE_PB Perceived benefits of CovidsafeBE 2.2110656 1.2535159 1 7 








5 15.50 80 
Z2 Gender 0.6147541 0.4886602 0 1 
Z5 Student 0.3688525 0.4844835 0 1 
Z6 Employee 0.2295082 0.4222507 0 1 
Z7 Retired 0.0737705 0.2624750 0 1 
Z8 Civil servent 0.1393443 0.3477335 0 1 
Z9 Long-term illness 0.0081967 0.0905357 0 1 
Z10 Self-employed 0.0737705 0.2624750 0 1 
Z11 Manager 0.0327869 0.1788127 0 1 
Z12 Currently unemployed 0.0327869 0.1788127 0 1 
Z14 Liberal proffesion 0.0163934 0.1275067 0 1 
Z15 Higher secondary 0.1803279 0.3860457 0 1 
Z16 Bachelor 0.3196721 0.4682726 0 1 
Z17 Master 0.4918033 0.5019944 0 1 
Z18 PhD 0.0081967 0.0905357 0 1 
 
Appendix  N: CovidsafeBE, Multicollinearity test 
Adoption: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance 
Parameter estimates 






Pr > |t| Tolerance   Variance 
inflation 
Coefficients de corrélation de Pearson, N = 122 
Proba > |r| sous H0: Rho=0 
























0.44717 0.23840 0.31410 0.00784 0.16559 










0.09060 0.29762 0.28246 0.60071 0.00824 
0.0734 0.9933 0.0789 0.3210 0.0009 0.0016 <.0001 0.9282 
BE_KN 
Knowledge 
0.02625 0.20445 0.15970 
1.00000 
-
0.23267 0.16263 0.09841 0.18201 0.26528 
0.7741 0.0239 0.0789 0.0099 0.0735 0.2808 0.0448 0.0031 
BE_PR 
Perceived risks 

















0.0515 <.0001 0.3210 0.0099 0.0263 0.0003 0.0393 0.8065 
BE_PB 
Perceived benefits of 
CovidsafeBE 
-




0.70825 0.25146 0.08999 










0.3214 0.0004 0.0016 0.2808 0.0003 <.0001 0.0745 0.6052 
Age 
How old are you? (from 
15.5 to 80 year's old) 
-
0.10658 0.00784 0.60071 0.18201 
-
0.18687 0.25146 0.16205 
1.00000 
0.05652 




0.08159 0.16559 0.00824 0.26528 0.02240 0.08999 0.04727 0.05652 




Intercept Intercept 1 1.46569 0.47362 3.09 0.0025 . 0 
BE_PR Perceived risks regarding data privacy on 
CovidsafeBE 
1 -0.24476 0.08157 -3.00 0.0033 0.93760 1.06655 
BE_PB Perceived benefits of CovidsafeBE 1 0.90272 0.08755 10.31 <.0001 0.90552 1.10433 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00427 0.00620 -0.69 0.4927 0.91583 1.09191 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.02416 0.21496 -0.11 0.9107 0.98848 1.01166 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 
Number Eigenvalue Condition index Intercept BE_PR BE_PB Age Z2 
1 4.26529 1.00000 0.00253 0.00491 0.01003 0.00788 0.01527 
2 0.33046 3.59266 0.00285 0.00316 0.06042 0.03803 0.92490 
3 0.22127 4.39046 0.01302 0.20923 0.43899 0.01436 0.04043 
4 0.14887 5.35276 0.00089182 0.06172 0.36829 0.72396 0.00388 
5 0.03412 11.18145 0.98070 0.72098 0.12228 0.21578 0.01552 
 
Perceived benefits: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance 
Variable Label DF Parameter estimate Standard error t value Pr > |t| Tolerance   Variance inflation 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.34708 0.44742 0.78 0.4395 . 0 
BE_TR Trust 1 0.22650 0.08804 2.57 0.0114 0.92293 1.08351 
BE_HB Habit 1 0.19917 0.09787 2.04 0.0441 0.62366 1.60344 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 0.04501 0.07254 0.62 0.5362 0.86747 1.15278 
Exp Experience 1 -0.14998 0.26875 -0.56 0.5779 0.93980 1.06406 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 0.00714 0.00766 0.93 0.3533 0.63042 1.58624 
Z2 Gender 1 0.06539 0.23084 0.28 0.7775 0.90195 1.10871 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 
Number Eigenvalue Condition index Intercept BE_TR BE_HB BE_KN Exp Age Z2 
1 5.48474 1.00000 0.00180 0.00312 0.00311 0.00355 0.00635 0.00330 0.00814 
2 0.79717 2.62302 0.00008301 0.00001528 0.00333 0.00040323 0.85743 0.00261 0.01246 
3 0.34791 3.97051 0.00142 0.00000192 0.04288 0.00008509 0.00331 0.03753 0.73423 
4 0.15998 5.85516 0.02185 0.21804 0.09177 0.08899 0.11928 0.15223 0.22010 
5 0.09704 7.51815 0.00818 0.31732 0.00779 0.81443 0.00236 0.00046946 0.01842 
6 0.06960 8.87690 0.00123 0.01344 0.77397 5.425009E-8 0.00732 0.78980 0.00626 
7 0.04356 11.22150 0.96543 0.44806 0.07715 0.09255 0.00394 0.01405 0.00039824 
 
Perceived risks: Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance 
Variable Label DF Parameter estimate Standard error t value Pr > |t| Tolerance   Variance inflation 
Intercept Intercept 1 6.14522 0.43691 14.07 <.0001 . 0 
BE_TR Trust 1 -0.43896 0.08597 -5.11 <.0001 0.92293 1.08351 
BE_HB Habit 1 0.02761 0.09557 0.29 0.7732 0.62366 1.60344 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 -0.12339 0.07084 -1.74 0.0842 0.86747 1.15278 
Exp Experience 1 -0.38133 0.26244 -1.45 0.1489 0.93980 1.06406 
Age How old are you? (from 15.5 to 80 year's old) 1 -0.01458 0.00748 -1.95 0.0538 0.63042 1.58624 
Z2 Gender 1 0.35811 0.22542 1.59 0.1149 0.90195 1.10871 
 
Collinearity diagnostic 
  Proportion of variation 
Number Eigenvalue Condition index Intercept BE_TR BE_HB BE_KN Exp Age Z2 




2 0.79717 2.62302 0.00008301 0.00001528 0.00333 0.00040323 0.85743 0.00261 0.01246 
3 0.34791 3.97051 0.00142 0.00000192 0.04288 0.00008509 0.00331 0.03753 0.73423 
4 0.15998 5.85516 0.02185 0.21804 0.09177 0.08899 0.11928 0.15223 0.22010 
5 0.09704 7.51815 0.00818 0.31732 0.00779 0.81443 0.00236 0.00046946 0.01842 
6 0.06960 8.87690 0.00123 0.01344 0.77397 5.425009E-8 0.00732 0.78980 0.00626 
7 0.04356 11.22150 0.96543 0.44806 0.07715 0.09255 0.00394 0.01405 0.00039824 
 
Appendix  O: CovidsafeBE, Regressions  
Appendix O.1: Model 1 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 4 179.60925 44.90231 34.02 <.0001 
Error 117 154.40920 1.31974   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    





Coeff Var 48.58002   
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.46569 0.47362 3.09 0.0025 0 
BE_PB 
Perceived benefits of 
CovidsafeBE 1 0.90272 0.08755 10.31 <.0001 0.68107 
BE_PR 
Perceived risks regarding data 
privacy on CovidsafeBE 1 -0.24476 0.08157 -3.00 0.0033 -0.19478 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00427 0.00620 -0.69 0.4927 -0.04520 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.02416 0.21496 -0.11 0.9107 -0.00711 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 167.72775 55.90925 39.67 <.0001 
Error 118 166.29070 1.40924   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    
















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.36473 0.30945 1.18 0.2409 0 
BE_PB 
Perceived benefits of 
CovidsafeBE 1 0.94618 0.08923 10.60 <.0001 0.71386 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.00156 0.00634 -0.25 0.8058 -0.01655 
Z2 Gender 1 -0.05454 0.22188 -0.25 0.8063 -0.01604 
 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 39.31222 13.10407 5.25 0.0020 
Error 118 294.70622 2.49751   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    





Coeff Var 66.82942   
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 3.34867 0.60115 5.57 <.0001 0 
BE_PR 
Perceived risks regarding data 
privacy on CovidsafeBE 1 -0.38391 0.11067 -3.47 0.0007 -0.30551 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.00965 0.00832 1.16 0.2487 0.10223 
Z2 Gender 1 0.16433 0.29464 0.56 0.5781 0.04833 
 
Appendix O.2: Model 2 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 6 30.42703 5.07117 3.65 0.0024 
Error 115 159.70054 1.38870   
Corrected 
total 121 190.12756    





Coeff Var 53.29699 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.34708 0.44742 0.78 0.4395 0 




BE_HB Habit 1 0.19917 0.09787 2.04 0.0441 0.22023 
BE_TR Trust 1 0.22650 0.08804 2.57 0.0114 0.22888 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 0.04501 0.07254 0.62 0.5362 0.05693 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.00714 0.00766 0.93 0.3533 0.10032 
Z2 Gender 1 0.06539 0.23084 0.28 0.7775 0.02549 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 13.30788 4.43596 2.96 0.0351 
Error 118 176.81968 1.49847   
Corrected 
total 121 190.12756    





Coeff Var 55.36339 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.46501 0.30525 4.80 <.0001 0 
Exp Experience 1 -0.09737 0.27298 -0.36 0.7220 -0.03194 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.01736 0.00636 2.73 0.0073 0.24389 
Z2 Gender 1 0.18880 0.22876 0.83 0.4109 0.07360 
 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 22.91473 7.63824 5.39 0.0016 
Error 118 167.21283 1.41706   
Corrected 
total 121 190.12756    





Coeff Var 53.83840 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.68120 0.40169 1.70 0.0925 0 
BE_TR Trust 1 0.22779 0.08663 2.63 0.0097 0.23018 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.01762 0.00616 2.86 0.0050 0.24751 











square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 15.12074 5.04025 3.40 0.0202 
Error 118 175.00682 1.48311   
Corrected 
total 121 190.12756    





Coeff Var 55.07885 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.18205 0.36021 3.28 0.0014 0 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 0.08546 0.07353 1.16 0.2475 0.10811 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.01631 0.00640 2.55 0.0121 0.22905 
Z2 Gender 1 0.12407 0.23499 0.53 0.5985 0.04837 
 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 19.68625 6.56208 4.54 0.0047 
Error 118 170.44132 1.44442   
Corrected 
total 121 190.12756    





Coeff Var 54.35566 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.15905 0.31269 3.71 0.0003 0 
BE_HB Habit 1 0.21038 0.09865 2.13 0.0350 0.23262 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.00762 0.00778 0.98 0.3290 0.10708 
Z2 Gender 1 0.21041 0.22406 0.94 0.3496 0.08202 
Appendix O.3: Model 3 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 6 59.24117 9.87353 7.46 <.0001 
Error 115 152.28979 1.32426   
Corrected 









Coeff Var 30.54241 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 6.14522 0.43691 14.07 <.0001 0 
Exp Experience 1 -0.38133 0.26244 -1.45 0.1489 -0.11859 
BE_HB Habit 1 0.02761 0.09557 0.29 0.7732 0.02894 
BE_TR Trust 1 -0.43896 0.08597 -5.11 <.0001 -0.42052 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 -0.12339 0.07084 -1.74 0.0842 -0.14797 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.01458 0.00748 -1.95 0.0538 -0.19414 
Z2 Gender 1 0.35811 0.22542 1.59 0.1149 0.13235 
 
Individual regressions 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 15.73174 5.24391 3.16 0.0273 
Error 118 195.79923 1.65932   
Corrected 
total 121 211.53097    





Coeff Var 34.18860 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 4.46107 0.32122 13.89 <.0001 0 
Exp Experience 1 -0.63523 0.28725 -2.21 0.0289 -0.19756 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.01569 0.00670 -2.34 0.0208 -0.20895 
Z2 Gender 1 0.04896 0.24073 0.20 0.8392 0.01810 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 51.88922 17.29641 12.78 <.0001 
Error 118 159.64175 1.35290   
Corrected 
total 121 211.53097    

















value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 5.83932 0.39249 14.88 <.0001 0 
BE_TR Trust 1 -0.48423 0.08465 -5.72 <.0001 -0.46389 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.01423 0.00602 -2.37 0.0197 -0.18944 
Z2 Gender 1 0.29743 0.21976 1.35 0.1785 0.10992 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 17.67820 5.89273 3.59 0.0159 
Error 118 193.85277 1.64282   
Corrected 
total 121 211.53097    





Coeff Var 34.01824 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 4.80343 0.37911 12.67 <.0001 0 
BE_KN Knowledge 1 -0.19152 0.07739 -2.47 0.0148 -0.22968 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 -0.01128 0.00673 -1.68 0.0963 -0.15025 
Z2 Gender 1 0.24845 0.24732 1.00 0.3172 0.09182 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 7.78488 2.59496 1.50 0.2174 
Error 118 203.74609 1.72666   
Corrected 
total 121 211.53097    
Appendix  P: CovidsafeBE, Moderation analysis 
Appendix P.1: Transparency 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 
0.3454 0.1193 2.4930 5.3272 3.0000 118.0000 0.0018 
Model 
 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 5.5508 1.2690 4.3743 0.0000 3.0379 8.0637 
BE_PR -0.8093 0.3213 -2.5183 0.0131 -1.4456 -0.1729 




Int_1 0.1023 0.0773 1.3233 0.1883 -0.0508 0.2555 
Since there the moderator is not significant, it is interesting to analyze if transparency has a 






square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 9.82179 3.27393 1.19 0.3160 
Error 118 324.19665 2.74743   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    
Appendix P.2: Control 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 
0.3682 0.1356 2.4469 6.1687 3.0000 118.0000 0.0006 
Model 
 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 1.0447 1.5069 0.6933 0.4895 -1.9394 4.0288 
BE_PR 0.2820 0.3559 0.7924 0.4297 -0.4228 0.9867 
BE_C 0.5653 0.2770 2.0407 0.0435 0.0167 1.1138 







square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 24.78568 8.26189 3.15 0.0275 
Error 118 309.23276 2.62062   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    





Coeff Var 68.45667 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 0.73549 0.55777 1.32 0.1898 0 
BE_C Control over CovidsafeBE 1 0.28352 0.11648 2.43 0.0164 0.22534 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.00900 0.00874 1.03 0.3051 0.09537 
Z2 Gender 1 0.10187 0.30187 0.34 0.7364 0.02996 
 
Appendix P.3: Bandwagon 
Model Summary 
R R-sq MSE F df1 df2 p 





 coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
constant 2.9860 1.0076 2.9634 0.0037 0.9906 4.9814 
BE_PR -0.4464 0.2592 -1.7225 0.0876 -0.9597 0.0668 
BE_BW 0.3370 0.3779 0.8918 0.3743 -0.4113 1.0853 
Int_1 0.0220 0.0991 0.2215 0.8251 -0.1744 0.2183 
Since there the moderator is not significant, it is interesting to analyze if bandwagon has a 







square F value Pr > F 
Model 3 29.68811 9.89604 3.84 0.0116 
Error 118 304.33033 2.57907   
Corrected 
total 121 334.01844    





Coeff Var 67.91186 
  
Estimated parameters 






value Pr > |t| 
Standardize
d estimate 
Intercept Intercept 1 1.12724 0.43549 2.59 0.0109 0 
BE_BW Bandwagon 1 0.41605 0.14782 2.81 0.0057 0.28205 
Age 
How old are you? (from 15.5 
to 80 year's old) 1 0.00227 0.00947 0.24 0.8107 0.02409 
Z2 Gender 1 0.16214 0.29946 0.54 0.5892 0.04769 
 
 
